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Abstract 
 
 
 
Cambodia´s complicated political landscape has created a development context that the 
international community long struggled to navigate. In this paper I – through a theoretical 
framework that conceptualises a political context as a historically located totality and defines 
the quest for political legitimacy as a constraint that can be used to make inferences about the 
behaviour and actions preferred by the ruling elite – explore how development endeavours 
can learn to work better within Cambodia´s political landscape. Through a qualitative 
exploration based on insights from previous research and 15 semi-structured interviews I 
conducted during my visit to the country, I argue that Cambodia´s contemporary political 
context has been shaped by how the ruling elite has been able to transform traditional patron-
client relations into an elaborate modern mass patronage system. Within this system, 
legitimacy is maintained through a political theatre that builds on the constructed perception 
of “Khmerness” and projects notions of fear, protection and moral authority. While this 
articulation of political legitimacy is found to limit reforms and policies that are perceived to 
undermine the influence of the elite, it also provides a possible avenue of influence. Within 
the current circumstances, the elite is increasingly pressured to deliver tangible improvements 
at the local level, and strategies that utilise the developmental space this opens up could be 
more capable of navigating the murky waters constituted by Cambodia´s socio-political 
context.  
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Modern Patronage and Development in 
Cambodia: Historical Foundations, Modern 
Re-Articulations, and the Contemporary 
Quest for Political Legitimacy 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Cambodia´s complicated political landscape has created a development context that the 
international community long struggled to navigate (see for example Ear 2007; Cock 2010a). 
Today, an extensive modern patronage system, built on exploitation and corruption, drains 
resources away from the public and concentrates both financial and political power in the 
hands of a small elite (Un 2005: 224; Un 2006: 229; Cock 2010b 528-529; Global Witness 
2016). Despite the potential difficulties associated with development work within this context 
(see for example Hughes & Conway 2003: 65), the international community remains positive 
about Cambodia´s future prospects and continue to allocate large amounts of aid to the 
country (Ledgerwood 2012: 197) Unfortunately, billions of dollars in official development 
assistance and years of attempted internal reforms have done relatively little to improve the 
situation for the poorer sections of the Khmer population (Bruce St John 2005: 406; Ear 2007: 
68; Davies 2011: 313).  
 
In this paper, I suggest that it is possible to get a better understanding of Cambodia’s 
developmental difficulties by examining the political context and the articulation of political 
legitimacy it engenders. Through a qualitative exploration based on insights from previous 
studies and 15 semi-structured interviews I conducted during my visit to the country, I argue 
that the current political context has been shaped by how the country´s ruling elite has 
transformed traditional protective structures into a mass patronage system where personal 
alliances and state capacities are intertwined, and a combination of inducements, coercion, 
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and appeals to righteousness, are used to elicit votes from an exploited population. Within this 
context, political legitimacy is maintained through an elaborate political theatre that, by 
evoking notions corresponding to the ideals that underpin the public perception of 
“Khmerness” (i.e. characteristics and behaviour that are perceived to be important features of 
the Khmer identity), is used to construct a legitimising narrative that builds on fear, protection 
and moral authority. For development practitioners, this articulation of political legitimacy 
means that attempts at overarching governance reform and policies that are perceived to 
undermine elite influence are likely to be either circumvented or resisted. Nevertheless, there 
are strategies that could be more conductive to Cambodia´s political landscape. Due to the 
dynamics of the modern patronage system, and the perceptions of legitimacy that underpin it, 
the elite is pressured to deliver, or at least give the perception of, tangible improvements at the 
local level. This potential conflation of interests (between the elite and the development 
community) represents a promising avenue of influence. Working through channels that 
corresponds to the political legitimacy of the elite is, however, a precarious undertaking that 
requires delicate manoeuvring and tools that are specifically adapted to work within the lower 
levels of Cambodia´s modern patronage system.  
 
 
1.1 Specific Aim and Research Question 
 
The premise of this paper is that, due to the complex dynamic that shape Cambodia´s political 
system, even the smallest positive impact rely on understanding, and taking advantage of, the 
mechanisms that dominate the local context. The notion of context-adapted development 
strategies that acknowledge the “obstacles” engendered by local structures is, of course, not 
new to academia – or even mainstream development organisations (see for example Fritz et al 
2014: 2-3, 11) – but it appears that such superficial rhetoric seldom translate into strategies 
that differ from the universalistic models that dominated the 1980s and 1990s (Hughes & Un 
2011: 13). Instead of blindly focusing on how to change reigning power structures and local 
circumstances to correspond with our presumptions about proper societal ideals, the aim of 
this paper is to explore how we can learn to work better within the constraints and 
possibilities engendered by Cambodia´s political context. The basic assumption is that a better 
understanding of Cambodia’s political context, and the foundations of political legitimacy it 
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engenders, can provide us with important insights about the possible conductivity of different 
forms of development efforts.  
 
Based on this, the paper is structured around the question: How does Cambodia´s 
contemporary political context, and the foundations of political legitimacy it engenders, affect 
the conditions for “pro-poor” development policies? 
 
Pro-poor development policies, in this case, simply refers to policies that are directed at both 
proximate and structural causes of poverty – i.e. at both the immediate factors that cause 
poverty (e.g. lack of resources), and the structural factors that underpin them (e.g. exploitative 
relationships) (see for example Hughes & Conway 2003: 13-15). The conceptualisations of 
political context and political legitimacy will be further elaborated in the theory section.  
 
The disposition of the subsequent sections of the paper can be summarised as follows. I begin 
by clarifying why I have chosen to explore development through the prism of political 
legitimacy. Thereafter, I elaborate my theoretical foundations and methodological 
considerations. After the theoretical and methodological foundations have been laid, I turn to 
a brief historical review of the concept of development and the way it has been implemented 
in Cambodia. This review is followed by the main empirical section, where I – based on a 
combination of secondary and primary source data – present my analysis of Cambodia´s 
political context and the foundations of political legitimacy it engenders. The result of this 
analysis is then, ultimately, used to explore the conductivity of certain development efforts 
and to make some tentative suggestions about future prospects.  
 
 
1.2 Political Legitimacy and Development 
 
While the connection might not be immediately obvious, I would argue that there are good 
reasons to examine the potential conditions for development through the prism of political 
legitimacy. The concept of political legitimacy, and the factors that underpin it, can be a 
useful analytical tool due to the internal dynamics that it engenders. It is now generally 
accepted that most forms of successful and stable power-relationships – where power is 
defined as the ability to restrict someone’s freedom (either by sanctions or inducements), and 
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subordinate their purposes to one´s own – need to be underpinned by some form of legitimacy 
(pure coercion is usually less stable than consent) (Beetham 1991: 43-45). It is also argued 
that the most common justification for a certain power-structure is that it will serve the 
collective interest of the population. However, due to the social organisation of power – i.e. 
that power, and power differences, arise from, and are maintained through, social 
arrangements that define the “rules of exclusion” (who have access to power and on what 
grounds) – these collective interests will most likely be met in ways that serve the interests of 
the powerful (i.e. in ways that also contribute to their continual privilege by preserving the 
current order). The quest for political legitimacy (a prerequisite for the maintenance of the 
current order) thus serves as a constraint on the scope of action for elite actors by encouraging 
a behaviour that conforms to the criteria that underpin the public perception of legitimate 
power. These constraints can, therefore, be used as a “point of inference” that allows us, at 
least tentatively, to theorise about the kind of actions that are preferred by elite actors within a 
specific context (Beetham 1991: 35-37, 43-45). Thus, a deconstruction and examination of the 
foundations of political legitimacy engendered within a specific political context, can be used 
to identify specific constraints on elite behaviour and, by extension, the most likely strategies 
that this elite will use to serve the collective interest (since these strategies are likely to be 
pursued in a manner that will improve/maintain their political legitimacy). Assuming, as I do, 
that poverty alleviation is a collective interest, this information can be used to make some 
tentative inferences about the kind of development strategies that best conform to the criteria 
set by the context-specific articulation of political legitimacy. Ultimately, such inferences can 
serve as the basis for an assessment of the potential conditions for ”pro-poor" development 
policies. It could also tell us something about the utility, or futility, of current development 
strategies, and provide some guidance for future endeavours. 
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2. Theoretical Foundations 
 
 
 
 
 
To get a better understanding of the foundations of political legitimacy in contemporary 
Cambodia, I am beginning my inquiries with an exploration of the political context that has 
engendered these foundations. The theoretical foundations behind my conceptualisation of a 
political context are influenced by how we can analyse the changing dynamics of the world 
system by exploring the formation, and transformation, of historical structures. In short, and 
very simplified, a historical structure, according to Robert Cox (1981), is constituted by three 
dialectically interacting forces – material capabilities, ideas, and institutions – that shape the 
structure within three different societal levels of analysis (called spheres of activity) – namely, 
the social relations of production, forms of states, and world orders. The main actors within a 
historical structure are engendered by the interaction of forces that constitute the realm of the 
social relations of production. These actors, defined as social forces, are the main 
beneficiaries of the social relations of production that have been engendered within a 
historically located totality (i.e. the specific articulation that characterises a temporally limited 
domain of history). Social forces work within and across all spheres of activity and, based on 
the assumption that they work to secure and proliferate the social order that is the basis of 
their existence, they have the agency to shape forms of states and world orders. Thus, by 
breaking down historical structures and analysing the interactions of forces within our 
historically limited totality, and the social forces it engenders, it is possible to get a better 
understanding of the dynamic that shape the current world system (Cox 1981: 136-138; Bieler 
and Morton 2004: 87-88; Moolakkattu 2009: 448).  
 
This theorised model of the world system is obviously constructed to highlight the formation, 
and transformation, of macro-level dynamics, but the notions that underpin it got the potential 
to enhance our understanding of meso- and micro-level phenomena. If we conceptualise a 
context – a political context in this case – as the kind of historically located totality mentioned 
above, it is possible to construct a simplified framework that can be used to explore its 
specificity. Ontologically, any located totality is constituted by a specific interaction between 
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material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Material capabilities refer to material structures 
(like economic structures and distribution of resources); ideas are notions that shape the 
collective image of social order; and institutions represent the means for stabilising the social 
order engendered by the interaction of material capabilities and ideas. However, these forces 
are just broad categorisations, and to determine the specific articulation of interacting forces 
that defines a located totality, we have to explore relevant empirical material and trace the 
historical processes that have engendered it. Since it is assumed that social forces are 
autonomous actors with an ability to shape the circumstances around them, their influence 
plays an important role in this process (Cox 1981: 136-138). Based on these premises, it is by 
identifying the main social forces, and tracing the historical processes through which they 
have been able to constitute and transform their surrounding circumstances, that we can begin 
to understand the specific characteristics of a historically located totality (e.g. a political 
context).  Within the confines of this paper, the role of social forces is ascribed to Cambodia´s 
ruling elite, and the specific characteristics of the political context will be analysed by 
exploring how they have been able to shape the political context.  
 
Through a desk-based study (Petersson 2015), I have previously identified the main features 
of Cambodia´s political context. By reviewing some of the more prominent literature on the 
subject, this study concluded that the main categories of Cambodia´s political context could 
be conceptualised as follows:  
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In short, this study revealed that the material foundations of Cambodia´s political context 
appear to be shaped by a web of inter-personal relationships that affects the control of the 
state and its institutions, and an economic structure that tilts the distribution of the country´s 
resources in advantage of the political elite. It also indicated that cultural and historical 
legacies are, somehow, used to shape the collective image of the current social order, and that 
the combined force of the material and ideational domains has contributed to an 
institutionalised social order that makes it difficult for the Khmer population to question the 
current system (Petersson 2015). However, these were only tentative conclusions unfit to 
assess developmental constraints and possibilities. While the tentative conclusions from my 
earlier study have served as a guiding frame, this paper represents an attempt to expand and 
elaborate my previous findings and transform them into a tool that can be used to engender 
insights for future developmental endeavours. Here, by tracing the historical trajectory that 
has engendered the articulations of the current context, using both secondary and primary 
data, I have been able to expand and refine the analysis of Cambodia´s political system and, 
subsequently, use this enhanced understanding to explore the foundations of the contemporary 
elite´s political legitimacy.  
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Legitimate power is, according to David Beetham (1991: 3, 15), power that is acquired and 
exercised according to justifiable rules and with evidence of consent, and the public 
perception of legitimate power is shaped by its conformity to the “three dimensions of 
legitimacy”. These three dimensions can be summarised as: 1) the ability to conform to 
established rules – which can include formal rules, like those governing an electoral 
democracy, or conventional rules, like informal rules based on traditions and customs; 2) that 
the established rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both the dominant and 
the subordinate parts of the power-structure; and, 3) that there is evidence of expressed 
consent by the subordinate part of the power-structure. Together, these three dimensions 
constitute the foundations of the public perception of legitimate power, and the legitimacy of 
the dominating echelons of society depends on their ability to conform to these criteria. This 
conformity is, of course, not an all or nothing affair, and the degree of legitimacy bestowed 
upon a particular power-structure depends on how well it is able to reflect the three 
dimensions (Beetham 1991: 15-19). 
 
The criteria for legitimate power is, once again, a general framework, and the articulations 
that constitute the foundations of political legitimacy within a polity are context-specific and 
have to be determined by an empirical investigation (Beetham 1991: 27-30). Here, the 
historically variable content that form the basis of political legitimacy in contemporary 
Cambodia will be determined by an investigation of the forces that constitute the political 
context. When these two notions – the forces that constitute Cambodia´s political context and 
the foundations of political legitimacy it engenders – are combined we get the following 
schematic representation:  
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As the representation illustrates, the principles behind the simplified representation of reality 
that guides the inquiries in this paper is that an empirical investigation of the specific 
characteristics of the material, ideational and institutional dimensions can provide a better 
understanding of the specificities of Cambodia´s political context. The information from this 
study can then be used to get a better understanding of the established rules of power that 
underpin the current power-structure; the principles that justify these rules; and the 
expressions of consent that enforce them. This, in turn, can be used to uncover Cambodia´s 
context-specific articulation of political legitimacy. Ultimately, the articulation of political 
legitimacy provides insight into the constraints placed upon the strategies elite actors are 
using to pursue collective interests, which can be used to assess the conditions for pro-poor 
development policies.  
 
Before I turn to the main empirical section, however, I will briefly explain and justify my 
methodological considerations, and explore some pre-existing explanations of the 
developmental problems that characterise contemporary Cambodia. 
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3. Methodological Considerations 
 
 
 
 
 
To draw the conclusions that are presented throughout this paper I am relying on a qualitative 
research strategy that utilises information gained from both secondary and primary sources of 
data. While such a strategy is appropriate for the kind of exploration I am embarking upon 
here, it comes with some methodological challenges that require consideration. A qualitative 
study cannot, obviously, gain its validity from the kind of “measurement accuracy” that is 
used to assess works that fall within the positivist tradition of scientific research (see for 
example Muijs 2011: 56). However, that does not imply that qualitative inquiries do not have 
to adhere to some scientific principles. To ensure that the scientific standards of qualitative 
research are fulfilled, it is important to use an explicitly defined frame of reference (e.g. 
theoretical framework) that ensures an adequate fit between the collected data, the concepts 
engendered, and the inferences made (Bryman 2012: 389-392). Since the meta-theoretical 
assumptions behind my explicitly defined framework were elaborated above, the sections 
below will explain how I have tried to assure an appropriate fit between my data collection 
methods, my sampling, and the inferences I make in my analysis.  
 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
The main data for this paper has been gathered through an exploration of what can broadly be 
labelled “secondary sources”. This somewhat abstract concept can encompass everything that 
is not gathered by those who actually witnessed or participated in the events they describe or 
refer to – i.e. primary sources (Halperin & Heath 2012: 229) – but the bulk of my information 
has been gathered through books and articles written by different scholars, and reports from 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Using such sources of information is, of course, 
not unproblematic. Secondary sources, by its very nature, contain information that has already 
been interpreted by others, and sometimes packaged to support the arguments and opinions of 
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its writer. As a result, they may contain biases and potential misrepresentations of reality 
(Halperin & Heath 2012: 330). To mitigate the risk of a continued disbursement of potential 
biases and misrepresentations (both my own and others), I have tried to choose my sources 
carefully. The articles that I build my narrative around have been published in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals, the books have been written by experienced scholars, and the NGO reports 
come from organisations with long-term experience of Cambodian issues. To counteract my 
own potential biases, I have incorporated sources written from different meta-theoretical 
standpoints, and emphasised regularities that reoccur from different perspectives. To further 
supplement and enhance the reliability of the information gathered from secondary sources, I 
have also collected some primary source data.  
 
The main objective of the primary source data collection – gathered through 15 semi-
structured interviews – was to enhance the validity of my inferences by expanding, gaining a 
secondary confirmation of, or simply rejecting, the information I gathered from the secondary 
sources. A semi-structured frame was chosen because it provided the kind of flexibility that 
allowed me to pursue the kind of topics that are relevant for my research question. The semi-
structured interview facilitates for a conversation that is guided by the objectives of the 
researcher, at the same time as it allows the respondents to pursue and elaborate on the issues 
and areas they believe are of most importance (O´Reilly 2009: 126-127). Since these issues 
and areas are of most interest to me, the semi-structured frame was best suited for my 
investigation. By discussing my presumptions and potential inferences with people with local 
experience and knowledge, I gained valuable information that could be used to enhance the 
accuracy of the depictions presented throughout this paper.  
 
The interviews included two different groups. The first set of interviews targeted 
representatives from international organisations and the NGO-sector. In total, I interviewed 
five members of this community. To get the best chance of acquiring some valuable 
information, I targeted established organisations with a local office in Cambodia and 
experience in working within the constraints of the political system. The second set of 
interviews targeted the Khmer public. Ten of these kinds of interviews were conducted, and 
the focus was to expand, confirm, or revise my understanding of public perceptions of 
religion and leadership. More specifically, I wanted to explore the interpretations and 
applications of the Buddhist cosmology, and how this worldview might affect the everyday 
perceptions of local people. The interviews were conducted on a small island located 
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somewhere along the vast Mekong river. Due to the recent increase in persecutions and 
violence against those associated with critique against the ruling regime (see for example 
Cheng & Dara 2016; Kijewski 2017; Touch & Kijewski 2017; Dara & Handley 2017), I have 
decided that it is best that the names of the respondents and the exact location of the island 
remain unnamed. The same logic applies to the names of the organisations and their 
representatives. A further elaboration of the rationale behind my sampling choices will be 
briefly presented below.   
 
 
3.2 Sampling 
 
The selection of interview respondents was based on a strategy designed to gain a better 
understanding of certain dimensions of my research problem. This strategy, sometimes 
referred to as “purposive sampling”, is a non-probability form of sampling common within 
the qualitative research tradition (Bryman 2012: 416). However, using a sampling strategy 
designed to elicit information that pertains specifically to the delimited domain of a research 
question engender some analytical limitations. Foremost of the inherent limitations of a 
purposive sampling strategy is, quite obviously, the inability to use the data as a foundation 
for any universally applicable inferences (Bryman 2012: 418). For the sake of analytical 
clarity, it is therefore important to mention that these form of generalisations are not pursued 
here. Generalizable and comparative research strategies might have important roles to fill in 
future elaborations of the findings presented here, but that cannot be contained within the 
scope of this paper. Specificities are the main focus here. Therefore, I would argue that 
purposive sampling provides an adequate strategy. With that said, the borders that delimit the 
confines of purposive sampling are wide, and many different strategies can be placed within 
it. Below I will briefly describe the sampling choices made in conjunction with my two 
different sets of interviews. 
  
In my first set of interviews, I targeted “established” international organisations and NGOs 
(i.e. some of the largest and most well-known organisations). The rationale for this selection 
is based on the unfortunate reality constituted by the murky waters of the Cambodian NGO-
sector. Since 1993, there has been a massive proliferation of NGOs in Cambodia, and based 
on recent reports, many of these organisations are exhibiting various degrees of lacking 
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professionalism. It is even argued that large parts of the NGO sector are incorporated in the 
overarching patronage structures (Henke 2011: 292-294, 308-309). Since I was trying to tap 
into the knowledge of experienced development workers, not evaluate the work of the 
development sector, the more established (and hopefully more independent) organisations 
were the starting points best suited for my investigation. 
 
The selection of the second set of interview respondents was mostly based on personal 
restrictions and the realities of the situation. These interviews were designed to explore the 
role of Buddhism and its impact on leadership perceptions. To achieve this, I had to choose a 
spatial domain that corresponded to my personal possibilities and constraints. By choosing to 
conduct this set of interviews on the unnamed island – which is a place I frequently visit and 
have stayed for extended periods of time – I chose a research site where my personal 
connections have made me a familiar presence and granted me access to gatekeepers, 
translators and informants. While this obviously limits the ability to make broad inferences 
about the general population, it allowed me to cut down on costs and travel times (which, due 
to financial limitations, were important factors).  
 
Once I was on the island, the interviews were organised into two separate stages. The first 
stage consisted of a set of interviews conducted with a monk, and an initiated layperson 
(known in Cambodia as an Achar) that actively participates in the organisation and 
ceremonial functions of the local pagoda. These interviews provided information about how 
those most familiar with the Buddhist teachings perceive the intersection between religion and 
leadership. The second set of interviews was then used to explore how members of the public 
perceive these issues. To elicit this kind of information, I conducted interviews with eight 
different individuals living in the village surrounding the pagoda.  
 
Since I do not speak the language, a translator was used during the interviews with the Khmer 
public. Using a translator can of course be problematic, and there is always a risk of 
misunderstandings and misrepresentations. During my interviews I tried to mitigate such risks 
by proceeding slowly and, when I felt that a possible misunderstanding might have occurred, 
asking the translator and respondent to repeat the statement. Within the current political 
climate, it also proved to be quite difficult to find respondents willing to discuss religion and 
politics with a stranger. As a result, many of the respondents were recruited from within the 
social circle of my gatekeeper/translator. This is of course limiting, but by including men and 
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women from different backgrounds and life stages, I at least tried to get the widest possible 
sample.  
 
With that said, it should be reiterated that I do not suggest that my interview findings can be 
extrapolated into a depiction that corresponds to the overall Cambodian population. The 
sample size, the limited geographical domain, and the personal design of my interviews are 
but a few factors that limit the possibility to make such conclusions. However, as previously 
mentioned, the purpose of the interviews was not to stand on their own. It was never intended 
that a unilateral reliance on one mode of data collection would provide the foundations for the 
validity and reliability of my inferences. But that does not mean that the interviews did not 
have a role to fill. Building on the analytical advantages that could be gained by incorporating 
multiple data sources – sometimes referred to as “triangulation” (see for example Bryman 
2012: 392) – the strength of my inferences is intended to arise from a process where the 
interview data is analysed in conjunction with the information gathered from secondary 
sources. Below, I will briefly describe the basic principles behind this process.  
 
 
3.3 Analysis and Coding 
 
The analytical coding process is a technique utilised to create some form of coherent account 
out of the messy complexity inherent in the collected material (Tilly 2006: 101-104). The 
exact procedure usually varies according to research strategy and personal preference 
(Bryman 2012: 575-577), but the basic technique I utilise here is based on an attempt to 
deconstruct collected data and reassemble it into an encompassing narrative that describes 
different aspects of the research problem. I will not go to far into the details here, but the basic 
principle is that an initial labelling process can be used to identify themes that recur in the 
data. These themes can then be fitted into larger categories that describe a cluster of themes 
with common characteristics. Different categories can, in turn, be connected to each other and 
placed within more overarching conceptualisations. Once the content of the 
conceptualisations has been identified, they can be used to construct an overarching narrative 
that describes the phenomena under scrutiny (Bryman 2012 575-577; O´Reilly 2009: 35-37).  
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Both the transcripts from the interviews and the information from the secondary sources was 
ultimately analysed in this manner. By doing so, I was able to use empirical material to define 
the specific characteristics of the predetermined theoretical conceptualisations (i.e. material 
capabilities, ideas, institutions, established rules governing power relations, justification of 
established rules, and expression of consent), and eventually construct the basic narrative that 
I use to analyse Cambodia´s political context and the foundations of political legitimacy it 
engenders. By cross-referencing my interview data with suggestions from secondary sources, 
it was, for example, possible to identify how, within Cambodia´s contemporary political 
context, notions of fear and protection seem to have become intertwined with the perceptions 
that underpin political legitimacy. Before I turn to my own arguments, however, it might be 
useful to set the stage, and place this inquiry within a larger context. Since this paper is based 
on the assumption that any understanding of contemporary events should emerge in 
conjunction with an understanding of the historical processes that engendered them (i.e. that 
they are historically located), it would be irresponsible not to, at lest briefly, consider the 
historical underpinnings of development, and the impact this intellectual legacy has had on 
Cambodia.  
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4. Connecting Past and Present: The 
Historical Underpinnings of Development 
and the Contemporary Understanding of 
Cambodia´s Development Dilemmas 
 
 
 
 
 
The will to improve, and the urge to intervene on behalf of those deemed to be in need of 
improvement, are tendencies with a relatively old intellectual legacy. While some might argue 
that the modern notions of development began to emerge in conjunction with the 
reconstruction efforts launched in the aftermath of the Second World War (Escobar 1995: 3-
4), others have argued for a genealogy that stretches as far back as the mid-19th century 
(Cowen & Shenton 1996). According to proponents of the latter perspective, the intellectual 
foundations that have served as the basis for all subsequent development strategies can be 
traced back to the philosophical tradition that emerged from within the Saint Simonians – a 
collection of philosopher inspired by Henri de Saint-Simon. Before the Saint Simonians, 
development was envisioned as an inherent process of decline and progress equated with the 
dynamics of a “natural order”. However, the Saint Simonians had different ideas, and argued 
that this process could be steered and managed through human intervention. Based on the 
belief in the emerging logics of secular science (the precursor of what we today might call 
positivism), they argued that, with the correct guidance and knowledge, natural fluctuations 
could be transformed into linear progress. When these ideas were embraced and elaborated by 
the French philosopher August Comte, they were transformed into the foundations of what 
would become a deeply rooted development doctrine. Through Comte`s influential reasoning, 
development was defined as a field of study dedicated to uncovering social laws that, through 
the trusteeship of those with the “correct knowledge” that these laws provide, could be used to 
achieve sustained improvement (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 19-29). Subsequently, a number 
of different classical thinkers have provided somewhat different interpretations of the 
circumstances that define trusteeship and the laws that define “correct knowledge”, but none 
of these philosophers did ever manage, at least according to some chroniclers of the 
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development genealogy, to completely detach themselves from the idea that these principles 
are the key to managed improvement (Cowen & Shenton 1996: ix-x).  
 
It was, therefore, perhaps, not a huge surprise that the same basic logic would guide the 
thinking that characterises what we today might call the “modern development era” (i.e. post-
Second World War development). Examined in the light of the 19th century legacies, familiar 
themes re-emerged in the decades following the Second World War. Just to mention some 
influential strands of post-war development thinking, Walter Rostow, based on the dichotomy 
between the traditional and the modern (where modernity was identified as the democratic 
industrialised western countries), argued that he had discovered laws that, if followed 
correctly, would put traditional societies on the path towards modernity (Potter et al 2008: 89-
91); Gunnar Myrdal and scholars inspired by the laws he discovered, whilst arguing against 
Rostow´s capitalist path, still contended that there were laws that dictated the path towards 
sustained improvement, and that this path should be followed by adhering to more protective 
state policies (Potter et al 2008: 96-99); and, in a more recent incarnation, it has been argued 
that the path towards successful development should be followed by adhering to the criteria 
inherent in the concept “good governance” (Kaufman et al 2000; Kaufman et al 2010). While 
they are based on different intellectual traditions and modern reinterpretations, the common 
denominator inherent in these approaches is that they still claimed to have identified social 
laws that, through the guidance of an appropriate trustee, could be used to achieve sustained 
improvement.  
 
Today, it could be argued that these foundations have remained strong and become important 
aspects of the dominating development discourse. In a similar way as 19th century scholars 
envisioned a linear process of ordered progress through appropriate trusteeship, it is now 
believed that scientifically produced knowledge – and especially scientific knowledge derived 
from the economic orthodoxy – should be used to understand the “underdeveloped” and guide 
them towards improvement (Escobar 1995: 52-54). While there are contending development 
discourses that offer alternative visions – and some strands within the mainstream tradition 
have certainly provided a more inclusive and encompassing framework for the development 
process (see for example Sen 1999) – it could still be argued that the contemporary discourse 
now predominantly defines development as an economic problem that should be managed by 
creating the “correct” conditions for economic growth (Escobar 1995: 52-54; Cowen & 
Shenton 1996: 423; Rist 2008: 261-262). These foundational ideas, at least, appear to have 
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been the main rationale behind the intervention program designed and implemented by the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).  
 
UNTAC, initiated in 1991, was an unprecedented international intervention that, based on 
what was then considered to be the pinnacle of development thinking, constructed a 
reconstruction strategy for a country brought to its nadir by decades of internal turmoil (Ear 
2007 73-74). Reflecting the zeitgeist of the 1980s and early 1990s, this strategy emphasised 
democratic institutions, a free market economy, and rationalised governance practices, and it 
was believed that these reforms would trigger a developmental process that would lunge the 
country into a positive trajectory towards sustained progress (Hughes 2001: 296-298: 
Springer 2016: 42). While some early observers argued for the success of the endeavour 
(Finlay 1995: 103-104), the ensuing decades of failed governance reforms (Ear 2007, 2009; 
McCarthy & Un 2017), exploitation of the poor (Un & Hughes 2011: 19; Springer 2016: 2), 
endemic corruption (Transparency International 2014), violence against the public and its 
representatives (LICADHO 2008, 2011), and the elite´s continual appropriation of land and 
natural resources (Global Witness 2007, 2009), are just some factors that indicate that 
UNTAC might not have had all of the positive impacts envisioned by its instigators. 
 
Subsequently, a new generation of scholars has begun to uncover some of the factors that 
contributed to the failure of Cambodia´s UNTAC-implemented “democratization-
development”. Approaching the problem from a variety of different meta-theoretical 
standpoints, this collection of scholarship has provided new insights into the different 
processes that hindered the evolutions anticipated by the UNTAC intervention. Since I am of 
the opinion that the construction of unnecessary dichotomies between insights gained through 
different ontological standpoints can be counterproductive for the understanding of the 
complexities inherent in socio-political phenomenon (realising, of course, that some 
standpoints are incommensurable), I prefer to focus less on their meta-theoretical accuracy 
and more on how these different accounts have contributed to the current understanding of 
Cambodian politics, society and culture. On the grander side of the analytical spectrum, 
scholars have, for example, produced books that explore the specific articulations of 
Cambodia´s hybridized form of democracy (Öjendal & Lilja 2009); highlight the elite´s 
ability to manipulate internal and external reforms (Hughes 2003); illustrate the distorting 
impacts engendered by an unreflective implementation of liberal economic policies (Springer 
2016); and, enhance the understanding of the intersection between politics and Cambodia´s 
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religious and cultural foundations (Kent and Chandler 2008). In addition, this strand of 
scholarship has also produced a number of chapters and articles that provide new insights into 
more specific societal processes. Such studies have, for example, explored how the economic 
free market transformation has affected the relationship between the ruling elite and the 
business sector (Cock 2011; Verver & Dahles 2015), and what impact these economic 
reforms have had on the rubber- (Slocomb 2011), rice-, garment- (Ear 2011), and cashew nut- 
industries (Padwe 2011); how traditions (Hughes 2006) rituals (Ledgerwood 2008) and 
celebrations (Davies 2011) have been transformed in the encounter with external cultural 
influences; and, how the influx of different forms of aid have affected internal power relations 
(Ear 2009; Cock 2010a; Sullivan 2011). 
 
Aggregated, current studies about Cambodia´s post-UNTAC phase paint a picture that 
deviates substantially from the outcomes anticipated by Cambodia´s early development 
architects. Working partly on premises set a century and a half ago, the notions of 
development that guided UNTAC´s efforts were based on a belief that the correct knowledge 
had been achieved – this was a time when the liberal democratic paradigm dominated the 
mainstream consciousness (see for example Fukuyama 1989) – and that, through the 
appropriate trusteeship of UNTAC, these features could be implemented with little concern 
about friction from local circumstances. Subsequent events have illustrated that these 
assumptions were incorrect. According to those who have studied Cambodia´s post-UNTAC 
development, external reforms are either being subsumed by indigenous structures (Baaz & 
Lilja 2014) or transformed through a process where they interact with local structures and 
engender new articulations. Over time, these articulations, sometimes referred to in terms of 
friction and hybridity (Lilja & Öjendal 2009; Hughes 2013, Öjendal & Ou 2013), have 
stabilized and formed the specific circumstances that define contemporary Cambodia. Despite 
some recent political upsets (Un 2015), those who study Cambodia´s democratization process 
contend that little real progress has been achieved (Lilja & Öjendal 2009: 298-299; Un 2011). 
For the foreseeable future, then, it appears as if Cambodia will continue to be characterised by 
the articulations engendered in the interaction between imposed external reforms and pre-
existing endogenous structures. 
 
For development practitioners, these findings are, or at least should be, an indication of the 
need to direct more attention towards how to work effectively within current circumstances.  
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With this in mind, it is time to turn to the main empirical section of the paper. Based on 
insights gained from previous scholarship and a small number of interviews I was able to 
conduct during my visit to the country, the following sections contain my analysis of the 
contemporary political context and the consequences its specificities might have for the 
strategies the ruling elite utilise to gain political legitimacy. The paper is then concluded with 
a brief incursion into the realm of future strategies and policies, where I discuss how these 
might benefit from an ability to use Cambodia´s specific articulation of political legitimacy to 
find new ways to work within, not only against, the factors that define the political context. 
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5. Cambodia´s Political Context: Ancient 
Foundations, Modern Re-articulations, and 
the Contemporary Quest for Legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
It could certainly be argued that the features that define contemporary Cambodia have been 
shaped by a modern history characterised by internal conflicts and external interventions (see 
for example Ear 2007: 79). However, perhaps due to the spectacular and tragic features of 
Cambodia´s modern history, it is easy to overlook the totality of the historical trajectory that 
has engendered the contemporary articulations that define it. Here, I try to embrace this 
totality. In what follows, I explore the evolution of Cambodia´s political context, and the 
foundations of political legitimacy it engenders, as a long historical process characterised by 
both continuity and change.  
 
 
5.1 Transforming Traditional Patron-Client Structures 
into Modern Patronage: Establishing the Material 
Foundations of Cambodia´s Contemporary Political 
Context 
 
To understand contemporary Cambodia, it is important to understand the relationships, and 
the distribution of resources, that underpin the elite´s basis of power. In what follows, I, 
therefore, begin by highlighting the historical importance of the protective structures we today 
define as patron-client relations. This is then followed by an investigation of the historical 
trajectory that transformed Cambodia´s traditional patron-client structures into the 
exploitative mass patronage system that today underpin the political context. Throughout the 
following sections I try to illustrate how, within the confines of Cambodia´s economic and 
political transformation, forces within Cambodia´s dominating political party – today known 
as the Cambodian People´s Party (CPP) – managed to transform an existing foundation of 
patron-client relations into a mass-patronage system sustained through exploitation and 
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endemic corruption. During this process, a small group of individuals associated with the 
long-standing prime minister, Hun Sen, were able to consolidate control over the state 
apparatus and its adjacent institutions; gain a significant influence over the country´s natural 
resource industries and the larger economic sphere; and, eventually, establish, and 
institutionalise, the governing structures that today define the political context.  
 
 
5.1.1 Patron-Client Protection and the Historical Underpinnings of State-
Society Relations 
 
After the fall of the prosperous Angkorean Empire (lasting between the 9th and 13th century), 
insistent conflicts and instability eventually eroded much of the region´s former glory. When 
Cambodia entered the 19th century, the country was poor and its approximately 750 000 
strong population consisted overwhelmingly of rural households involved in subsistence 
farming. Rural villages had relatively little contact with the overarching state institutions and 
governed themselves through informal arrangements relying on guidance from elderly and 
respected individuals (Chandler 2008: 91-99, 120-121, 126-127). Mirroring codes of conduct 
and organisational patterns persisting since pre-Angkorean times (Kimchoeun et al 2009: 49), 
these informal relations were hierarchal in nature, and people with limited means sought 
protection from those occupying the higher positions within the societal strata. In return for 
protection, people at the lower end of the hierarchy offered homage and loyalty to their 
benefactors. As such, villages in 19th century Cambodia were relatively isolated domains 
organised around relationships where the higher and lower levels of the social strata were 
intertwined through reciprocal commitments (Chandler 2008: 126-130). These organisational 
structures, today referred to as patron-client relationships (Kimchoueun et al 2009: 49), were 
an important part of both village life and royal culture, and while it has not always been the 
case in practice, it is believed that a majority of the population perceived them as “natural” 
and generally mutually beneficial (Chandler 2008: 126-130).  
 
During the French protectorate (1863-1953), French forces tried to implement a number of 
organisational reforms aimed at transforming Cambodia´s traditional power-basis into a 
rationalised bureaucratic governance structure.  Despite the influx of values from the French 
metropolis, however, the trust for the patron-client system remained intact, and while the 
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French will to rationalise this ancient system was strong, they never succeeded in their 
attempts to remove its influence from the societal sphere (Chandler 2008:174-178).  
 
Subsequently, the logics of patron-client protection remained an important influence during 
both the country´s independence process and its aftermath. For a new emerging political force 
– King Sihanouk, ordained under French tutelage in 1941 – Cambodia´s patron-client 
foundations became an important power-consolidating tool. During the 1950s, Sihanouk 
consolidated control over the Cambodian state apparatus and, strengthened by his growing 
influence, he was able to put more pressure on the French administration and, eventually, 
convince them to grant Cambodia its independence (Chandler 2008: 187, 191, 201, 204). The 
success of his independence-endeavour assured Sihanouk that he was the rightful leader of the 
country, and in 1955 he abdicated to pursue a political career. By portraying himself as the 
nation´s father and overarching patron, at the same time as he coerced opponents to defect to 
his side, he won an overwhelming victory in the 1955 election. Throughout the early years of 
his political rule, Sihanouk consolidated power to such an extent that, in 1958, Cambodia´s 
first period of pluralistic electoral politics effectively ended (and would not be resumed until 
the UNTAC implemented elections in the 1990s) (Chandler 2008: 211-218, 224- 234). By 
conveying an image of himself as the benevolent father and patron of, what he called, his 
family (i.e. the Cambodian population), whilst backing up this image by the coercive power 
of the state, Sihanouk appealed to the persistent trust for the patron-client dynamics, and 
illustrated how appeals to the logics of the traditional patron-client relationship could be 
utilised as a political tool in, at least, a semi-modern context (Kent & Chandler 2008: 6). 
Building on such perceptions, Sihanouk remained in power until 1970 (Chandler 2008: 244-
250). 
 
The years that followed Sihanouk´s demise is a relatively a well-documented era of 
Cambodian history (Hughes 2003: 20). In the early part of the 1970s, a number of different 
processes – including the incompetence of the Lon Nol lead republic regime that took over 
from Sihanouk, continual internal conflicts, and extensive bombing campaigns conducted by 
the Untied State´s army – converged to create a space where a communist faction could 
overthrow the government and seize control over the country (Chandler 2008: 251-254; 
Öjendal & Lilja 2009: 1). The communist regime, known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK), or 
the Khmer Rouge, implemented an unprecedented revolutionary reform program that 
intended to erase 2000 years of history and take the country back to, what they referred to as, 
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year zero. In this process, money, property, markets, education, religion, and freedom of 
movement were banned. Cities were emptied of inhabitants, dissidents or anyone believed to 
be a threat toward the regime were executed, and those who remained were forced into an 
existence characterised by strict surveillance and diminishing food supplies. The DK regime 
only lasted for 3 years, eight months, and twenty days, but when the dust of the revolution 
settled, an estimated 2 million people had perished and almost all of the pre-existing social 
institutions had been destroyed (Ear 2007: 73; Chandler 2008: 255-258).  
 
The DK regime ended in April 1979 when a Vietnamese-Khmer coalition army overtook 
Phnom Penh and forced the DK leadership to retreat back to the kind of peripheral guerrilla-
existence that had characterised their pre-revolutionary years. Disbursed throughout a number 
of key strongholds, they continued their insurgency towards the Vietnamese controlled 
government that came to power in the wake of their ousting. They were, however, never able 
to regain direct control over the Cambodian state (Chandler 2008: 272-276). Instead, as will 
be explored below, a small group of people once given the mandate to rule by the occupying 
Vietnamese forces, would, over the years, create a cohesive state apparatus, gain 
independence from Vietnam and, ultimately, by building on a revised version of Sihanouk´s 
political tactics, consolidate power and begin to build the structures that define the 
contemporary political context.  
 
 
5.1.2 Post-DK State-building and the Emergence of the Modern Patronage 
System 
 
Cambodia´s first post-DK government, assembled by the occupying Vietnamese forces, called 
itself the People´s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The leaders of the only legal political party 
that existed during the PRK period – the Kampuchean People´s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) 
– consisted to a large extent of former Communist Party officials that had defected to 
Vietnam in 1977-78. Under Vietnamese tutelage, this group was commissioned to rebuild the 
shattered Cambodian state (Hughes 2003: 21-22; Chandler 2008: 276).  
 
The upper echelons of the KPRP regime began to build the foundations of their subsequent 
power consolidation in the midst of the chaos and uncertainties that defined the early stages of 
the 1980s (see for example Chandler 2008: 278-284). However, despite the complicated 
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circumstances set by Cambodia´s post-conflict context, or perhaps due to the structural 
vacuum it provided, members of the ruling regime were able to underpin their power position 
by cultivating an intricate network of personal relationships (Hughes 2003: 38-44).   
 
While, in the early stages of the KPRP regime, state cohesion was low and the central 
authorities struggled to gain administrative control over local authorities (Hughes 2003: 23, 
30), the regime´s ability to create a cohesive state apparatus changed dramatically during 
Cambodia´s burgeoning economic transformation. The liberalisation of the economy, 
sometimes wrongly attributed solely to UNTAC policies, was initiated in 1989 by the 
Cambodian government and used as a tool to strengthen the cohesion of the state and limit the 
scope for oppositional forces (Hughes 2003: 19-20). By liberalising the economy, the people 
at the top of the political hierarchy gave themselves the opportunity to guide and control the 
privatisation of land and state owned enterprises. In this process, access to land and resources 
became dependent on power (including political, economic, and military power), and those 
controlling the state and its institutions were provided with a new set of tools that could be 
used to strengthen the attachment of individuals in control of local authorities (Hughes 2003: 
38-39). Once again, the patron-client logic appears to have reappeared as an organisational 
framework for Cambodia´s political relations, and the central government was transformed 
into a protective umbrella used to secure alliances with important stakeholders by providing 
them with opportunities and support in their endeavours to capitalise on the privatisation 
process (Hughes 2003: 40). For members of the ruling regime, these changes allowed them to 
build on an existing foundation of patron-client relations and, supported by the benefits 
granted to them by their high positions within the state, expand their personal networks and 
recruit the loyalty of important new allies (Hughes 2003: 40-44). 
 
The relationships created in the midst of Cambodia´s economic transformation were, 
however, far from traditional. They were engendered within a modern context that differs 
significantly from the one that characterised the existence in pre-modern Cambodia. The early 
1990s was dominated by UNTAC and their quest to transform the country into a liberal 
democracy, and this had a number of impacts on Cambodia´s societal context. Most 
importantly, it deepened the economic liberalisation, created new institutions for controlling 
the state, and implemented a system where political power became dependent on electoral 
success (Hughes 2003: 59-60). Faced with these structural opportunities and constraints, the 
ruling regime fundamentally transformed the dynamics of Cambodian patronage. Instead of 
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being localised protective expressions building on personal contact and reciprocal respect, 
patron-client logics were now intertwined with the capacities and modern bureaucracy of the 
new state. In this process, reciprocity between two parts was transformed into a one-way 
exploitation of a third part. Patrons, within the transformed relationship, now had the ability 
to reward the loyalty and support of their followers by offering them societal positions and 
protection that facilitated for rent-seeking and self-enrichment (Hughes 2003: 59-63; Kent 
2007: 335-336). Since this self-enrichment came at the expense of a third party (mostly the 
less fortunate segments of the population), this transformation resulted in a purely extractive 
modern patronage system (Hughes 2003: 62; Springer 2008: 144).  
 
Throughout the 1990s and the early years of the second millennia, the ruling regime – now 
operating under the name of the CPP – perfected the art of modern patronage politics, and by 
proliferating their personal networks, and combining it with an unbridled use of violence and 
intimidation, direct at both the political opposition and the voting populace, they secured a 
number of electoral victories – and when elections failed to provide the “right” outcomes, 
intimidation or brute force was used to convince oppositional parties that it was best they 
either shared power (as in the 1993 election) or conceded power (as in the coup d’état that 
followed the 1997 election) (Roberts 2002: 523-525, 530; Bruce St John 2005: 411; Un 2005: 
206-209). Eventually, relying on their ability to expand and proliferate their strings of 
mutually beneficial “friendships” – that could be used to intimidate nonconformists and 
materially reward compliance – the CPP created a cohesive state apparatus tied together by 
mutual goals of self-enrichment, monopolized material resources in the countryside, and 
amassed enough support to cement their position on the top of the socio-political hierarchy 
(Hughes 2003: 215-221; Un 2005: 209-222; Un 2006: 228-229).  
 
Throughout the 1990s, competing networks of patronage within the CPP struggled to become 
the dominating force in Cambodian politics (Un 2005: 217-218). However, as Cambodia 
entered the 21st century, material and political power began to consolidate within a small 
group of individuals closely associated with Hun Sen (Un 2005: 218-222; Morgenbesser 
2017: 11-12).  
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5.1.3 Manipulating Modern Patronage: The Rise of Hun Sen and the 
Contemporary Ruling Elite 
 
Hun Sen was part of the original group of former DK cadres commissioned, by the 
Vietnamese, with the responsibility to rebuild Cambodia. While he began as the PRK´s 
foreign minister, he would soon advance through the rankings (Chandler 2008: 272, 277; 
Human Rights Watch 2015: 22). Some newly published reports have documented Hun Sen´s 
rise to power, and since it can be argued that his rise has had the most influential impact on 
the contemporary political system (Osborne 2007: 117), this process provides some important 
insights into the structures that shape the current situation.   
 
Hun Sen was born in 1952 and, as such, his formative years were influenced by the 
tumultuous circumstances that defined the late 1960s and early 1970s (i.e. Sihanouk´s fading 
power, Lon Nol ´s coup d’état, and the growing Communist influence). After having 
witnessed the devastation caused by the American bombing campaigns and Lon Nol´s crusade 
against the communists, the 18 years old Hun Sen decided to join the armed insurgency 
against the regime. While he claimed to be unaware of it at the time, this insurgency was lead 
by Pol Pot (the subsequent leader of the DK regime). Due to Hun Sen´s relatively high 
educational status (most soldiers were not even able to read), he soon advanced through the 
Khmer Rouge hierarchy. During his years in the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen was involved in a 
number of military campaigns, and while he denies any involvement in some of the more 
atrocious episodes of the murderous regime, he remained a cadre until he defected to Vietnam 
in 1977. Whilst in exile, Hun Sen gained the trust of the Vietnamese and was given control of 
an exile force that eventually participated in the invasion that lead to the ousting of the Khmer 
Rouge (Human Rights Watch 2015: 6-22; Morgenbesser 2017: 5). After Khmer Rouge had 
been ousted, Hun Sen was appointed foreign minister of the newly established PRK regime 
(Morgenbesser 2017: 5). 
 
Due to his political prowess, Hun Sen, once again, quickly advanced through the hierarchy of 
the party, and when the current leader passed away (in 1985), he was appointed Prime 
Minister (Morgenbesser 2017: 5). From his place at the apex of the political hierarchy, Hun 
Sen was in the best possible position to control and manipulate the modern patronage system 
that emerged during Cambodia´s economic transformation. His political privileges gave him 
the ability to amass personal wealth for himself and his family by appropriating the country´s 
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natural resources (Global Witness 2007, 2009, 2016); act as a gatekeeper for high office and 
appoint loyal followers to strategic positions within the state and its institutions; and, 
manipulate and control the societal institutions meant to hold leaders accountable (Un 2006: 
231-233; Morgenbesser 2017:6-7). Building on such abilities, Hun Sen secured the loyalty of 
a number of key individuals – creating the group today loosely defined as “the ruling elite” 
(see for example Cock 2010b: 528-529) – and constructed a vast network of personal 
patronage connections that stretches throughout Cambodia´s entire societal foundation 
(Morgenbesser 2017: 11-12; Un 2006: 228-229). To understand Cambodia´s contemporary 
political context, it is, therefore, paramount to understand how the ruling elite is able to 
control the economy, the state, and the country´s accountability institutions.   
 
 
5.1.3.1. Accumulating Personal Wealth and Cultivating Business 
Connections: Consolidating Influence Over the Economic Sphere  
 
To amass the necessary wealth and loyalty needed to proliferate and sustain a vast modern 
patronage network, Hun Sen has secured a personal influence of Cambodia´s natural 
resources and its accompanying industries (Un & So 2009: 128). According to some reports, 
Hun Sen has used his position to allocate lucrative land concessions and timber plots to 
friends and family members (Global Witness 2007); grant close friends control over the 
country´s mining industry (Global Witness 2009: 17); and, made sure that he has a direct 
personal influence over the organisation that is responsible for all of Cambodia´s emerging 
petroleum activities (Global Witness 2009 36-38; Cock 2010b: 534-536). However, perhaps 
due to the diversified nature of the modern economy, a sole reliance on natural resources has 
not been enough to secure financial dominance and, during the years, the ruling elite has 
expanded the portfolio that assures that the country´s distribution of resources is heavily 
weighted in their advantage. 
 
The expansion of the ruling elite´s business connections has, arguably, been based on a two-
pronged approach. The first prong of the strategy has been aimed at proliferating the ruling 
elite´s, and in particular Hun Sen´s, personal business portfolio. While it has been difficult to 
survey the extent of his expanding family holdings, a recent report compiled by Global 
Witness (2016) has now given a first glimpse into the intricate web of connections and 
alliances that underpin Hun Sen´s personal business empire. Based on newly released data 
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from the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce´s corporate registry, the report suggests that Hun 
Sen´s family is in possession of a business portfolio worth, at least, around US$ 200 million, 
and that their realm of influence includes both well-known international brands and key 
national industries. Having found links to 114 registered companies, the report contends that 
Hun Sen and his family are personally involved in the country´s most profitable industries and 
that their influence spans over 20 different economic sectors (Global Witness 2016: 3-4, 10).  
 
The influence from this personal business empire has then been further supplemented by 
strengthening the connections to the larger business community. This second prong of the 
strategy has been aimed at co-opting influential financial actors and convincing them to direct 
their loyalty towards the ruling elite. The main tool in this recruitment campaign has, 
arguably, been the reinvention of the Oknha title. By reinventing the Oknha title – an old 
Khmer title re-introduced in 1994 and awarded, by the leadership of the CPP, to individuals 
that contribute more than US$ 100 000 to “national development projects” – the ruling elite 
has created an “elite pact” where prominent business leaders and entrepreneurs, in return for 
economic support to the CPP, receive protection and business-related privileges (Un & So 
2009: 127; Verver & Dahles 2015: 60-63, 65).  
 
 
5.1.3.2 Building Alliances: Consolidating Influence over the State 
 
Economic control does not, however, necessarily translate into political control, and to 
consolidate political influence, Hun Sen has assured that important societal positions are 
awarded to family members and loyal followers (Morgenbasser 2017: 6). 
 
Family members, both those bounded by blood and those acquired through marriages, seem to 
be Hun Sen´s favoured alliance partners. When it comes to the immediate family, he has, for 
example, appointed his brother, Hun Neang, to be the Governor of Kampong Cham, member 
of CPP´s Central Executive Committee, and the Chairman of the Commission of Interior, 
National Defence, Investigation, Anti-Corruption, and Public Function of the National 
Assembly. Hun Sen´s oldest son, Hun Manet, commands the National Counter-Terrorism 
Special Force and holds three other notable positions within the army; his middle son, Hun 
Manith, is the Commander of the Defence Ministry´s Intelligence Department; and, his 
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youngest son, Hun Many, is the leader of CPP´s youth organisation and a member of the 
National Assembly. If we go beyond the immediate family, strategic alliances have also been 
secured by the aforementioned marriages. Hun Sen´s oldest daughter, Hun Many, is married 
to the director of the Central Security Department; his youngest daughter, Hun Mali, is 
married to the son of the, recently deceased, Chairman of Council Ministers; his niece is 
married to the Commissioner of the National Police; and, his nephew is married to the 
daughter of the Deputy Commissioner of the National Police (Global Witness 2016: 26-27; 
Morgenbesser 2017: 6-7).  
 
In addition to family members, old friends and loyal followers have been used to further 
personalise the control over the state apparatus. Today, some of Hun Sen´s oldest friends are 
in charge of different military factions and paramilitary groups, and a number of people that 
proved their loyalty to him – including former bodyguards and soldiers – have either been 
promoted (Dara & Turton 2016) or given political positions within the CPP (Morgenbesser 
2017: 6). 
 
When these different alliances are put together, they begin to reveal the extent of the personal 
influence contained within the ruling elite´s modern patronage networks. Just this short 
overview of Hun Sen´s personal alliances indicates a direct influence over the upper echelons 
of the political sphere, the military, and the police – thus intertwining political domination 
with the coercive capabilities inherent in the military and police. In addition, his brother has, 
as we saw above, been put in control of the organisation responsible for stemming 
Cambodia´s endemic corruption. Such a placement could, according to some observers, be 
used to protect members of the ruling elite from corruption allegations (Morgenbesser 2017: 
7) and, instead, transform the anti-corruption legislation into a political weapon that can be 
aimed at oppositional forces and people unwilling to conform to the current hierarchy 
(LICADHO 2011: 30-34; Informant D, 6th of April 2017). As one informant told me:  
 
     “Of course, that was the intention of setting up this institution [the new Anti-Corruption Unit]. We know that. 
They protect corrupt people… If it is a person from the ruling party he can be protected, and he if from the 
opposition, let´s take him on. It is a tool. Obviously, it is a tool.” (Informant D, 6th of April 2017)   
 
As will be discussed in more detail below, such selective impunity and legislative attacks are 
a common occurrence in Cambodia.  
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5.1.3.3 Keeping the Judiciary Weak: Consolidating Influence over 
Cambodia´s Accountability Institutions 
 
Cambodia´s justice system has long been weak and tied to the ruling political regime (Un 
2009: 74-75; McCarthy & Un 2017: 104-105). During the post-UNTAC era, a number of 
reforms have tried to steer the judicial system towards a more independent existence. 
However, due to what some would describe as a lack of political will (Un 2006: 229-231; Un 
& Hughes 2011: 202-204), these reforms have failed to make a significant impact. Instead, 
the judiciary has remained weak and open for manipulation, and the political elite has utilised 
these persisting features to subvert the judiciary to the logics of modern patronage. By 
keeping judges salaries low; allowing corruption to prosper and determine the allocation of 
lucrative positions; placing high ranking CPP members in charge of reform initiatives; and, 
ensuring that institutions meant to oversee the appointment of judges and ensure the 
independence of the court are controlled by people with connections to the elite – the ruling 
elite has co-opted the judiciary and embedded it within their patronage network (Un 2006: 
231-233; Un 2009: 81-84; Un & Hughes 2011: 204; LICADHO 2011). Such control has 
turned the legal system into a political weapon that can be used to protect the elite and pursue 
those deemed to threaten their position (Un 2006: 231-233; McCarthy & Un 2017: 105-109). 
 
In addition to the impunity it provides for members of the ruling elite (LICADHO 2007: 9-
16), Cambodia´s legal system has been used to limit the scope of action for institutions and 
organisations that attempt to hold them accountable for their actions. In the past, journalist, 
opposition politicians, and other critical societal forces have been pursued, threatened, and 
killed without anyone being prosecuted for the crimes (Un 2011: 549-550, 552, 556-558; 
LICADHO 2007: 9-16). Politically targeted prosecutions have been used to further silence 
critics (LICADHO 2011: 21, 27, 34), and a combination of coercion and legal attacks have 
convinced many segments of the media, not already controlled by the elite – large parts of 
Cambodia´s media outlets are directly controlled by members of the ruling elite  – that it is 
best to invoke some form of self-censorship (Un 2005: 552; LICADHO 2008: i-iii 24-25, 56). 
While there are some islands of independence and media outlets still able to criticise, many of 
Cambodia´s accountability institutions have either been subverted to the inducement of 
patronage or coerced into self-censorship. 
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Unfortunately, Cambodia´s recent trajectory suggests that legislative attacks on the freedom 
of expression will continue to be an influential part of the political landscape (McCarthy & 
Un 2017: 105). The Law on Association and Non-Governmental Organisations, for example, 
was passed in 2015 and has been widely criticised for restricting the freedom of expression of 
NGOs and hindering their ability to report on human rights abuses and other sensitive issues. 
In addition, new provisions for defamation and insult, passed in 2010, have resulted in an 
increased ability to arrest and prosecute government critics (McCarthy & Un 2017: 105-109). 
As the country now prepares for the upcoming elections – a commune election will be held in 
2017 and the national election in 2018 – these provisions have been put into good use, and at 
the same time as violence has remained a present force (Dara et al 2016; Handley & Baliga 
2017), a wave of lawsuits and legal attacks has been directed at oppositional parties (Chheng 
2017; Sokchea et al 2017; Sockchea & Turton 2017; Turton 2017), human rights workers 
(Chheng & Turton 2016), and political analysts (Sokha & Kijewski 2017; Dara & Handley 
2017). Thus, for the foreseeable future, at least, it seems as if the space for critical voices will 
remain severely restricted. 
 
When the strategic use of legal impediments and impunity is added to the dynamics that 
characterise Cambodia´s modern patronage, the material foundations of the contemporary 
political context begin to emerge. By building on an existing foundation of traditional patron-
client relations, Cambodia´s emerging elite transformed traditional protective structures into a 
mass patronage system where personal alliances and state capacities are intertwined, and a 
combination of inducements and coercion are used to elicit votes from an exploited 
population.  
 
Coercion and inducements alone cannot, however, produce a stable order. The ability to 
construct some form of justificatory narrative is a vital ingredient. To really understand 
Cambodia´s political context it is, therefore, important to understand the historical and 
cultural imaginings that shape the collective consciousness and affect public perceptions of 
the contemporary order. In the following sections, such perceptions are explored by focusing 
on the evolution of Cambodia´s cultural underpinnings, and how these have been politically 
manipulated to construct a legitimising narrative for the dynamics of the modern patronage 
system.  
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5.2 Religion, Tradition, and the Political Re-articulation of 
Cambodian Culture  
 
While religion and tradition have an important influence on Cambodia´s societal relations 
(Kimchoeun et al 2007: 53-55), the ideas that underpin the contemporary articulation of 
Cambodian culture have been engendered through a long historical process shaped by 
displacement, interference, and interactions (Ollier & Winter 2006: 1-2). It is, therefore, 
important to emphasize that the historical perspective I take does not imply an assumption of 
cultural path dependence. Here, I do not in any way suggest that the ideational domain of the 
Khmer consciousness is shaped by some kind of static cultural tradition that forms an 
unbroken chain with ancient ideologies. Such depictions miss important aspects of the 
dynamic process that shape Cambodian culture (Hughes & Öjendal 2006). Thus, to 
understand how cultural legacies shape the current consciousness, and how this might 
influence perceptions within the current political system, both traditional foundations and 
more recent transformations have to be included in the analysis.  
 
Based on these premises, the following sections explore the origins, evolution, and 
manipulation of the cultural imagery that underpin current perceptions of what Penny 
Edwards (2007: 10-12) has called “original Khmerness”, or simply “Khmerness” (i.e. 
characteristics and behaviour that are perceived to be important features of the Khmer 
identity). By tracing Cambodia´s cultural and religious evolution, I illustrate how the current 
perception of Khmerness has been shaped by ancient foundations, colonial encounters, and 
modern re-articulations. In this process, Khmerness has become associated with the ancestral 
brilliance of the Angkorean culture and a religious moral order that focuses on merit and 
individual acts and behaviour grounded in the Buddhist scriptures. Ultimately, these 
perceptions have been co-opted and turned into a political tool used to construct a legitimising 
narrative for a number of Cambodia´s post-DK regimes. 
 
 
5.2.1 Constructing Khmerness: Ancient Roots 
 
Many historical accounts might prefer to linger in the cultural grandeur of the Angkorean 
Empire, but the ideas that shape Cambodia´s contemporary culture have far more distant 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 34	
origins. Around 2000 years ago, a cultural revolution, sometimes referred to as 
“Indianization”, brought a slow but steady flow of religious beliefs and values from India to 
the Cambodian shores. Throughout this process, Hindu notions, beliefs, and perspectives on 
kingship and politics were embedded within the higher and lower levels of the societal strata 
(Chandler 2008: 13-18). At this point in history, Buddhist ideas coexisted with its Hindu 
counterparts (Harris 2005: 24-25), but within the small city states that were scattered around 
present-day Cambodia, kings used Siva and other Hindu notions to legitimise the reigning 
social order and their right to rule (Chandler 2008: 22-23).  
 
As King Jayavarman II consolidated control over the northern areas of the country and laid 
the first foundations of the Angkorean empire (around the 9th century), Hindu notions 
continued to serve as the guiding principles, and this logic was subsequently adopted by a 
number of Angkorean kings. For large parts of the Angkorean era, kings were perceived to be 
patrons whose connection to the spiritual domain ensured enough rain for successful harvests; 
god-like entities that represented an ideal version of virtuosity and power; and, a central 
administrative figure in the reciprocal relationships that underpinned society (Chandler 2008: 
39-54). Adhering to these perceptions provided most of the Angkorean kings with a protective 
legitimacy, and it was not until the 12th and 13th century that Buddhism began to establish 
itself in the consciousness of the upper echelons of society (Edwards 2007: 97).  
 
The exact process that cemented the Buddhist influence is not known, but after having gained 
a more prominent role after 950 CE (Harris 2005: 4, 15), the religion began to prosper under 
the tutelage of King Jayavarman VII (r. 1181-1220) (Chandler 2008: 66). Under his rule, new 
legitimising principles, based on Buddhist notions, were introduced to the Khmer public and a 
new form of kingship emerged. Instead of claiming a special connection to Hindu deities, 
Jayavarman VII proposed that his right to rule was attributed to his extraordinary devotion to 
the Buddhist precepts and the meritorious behaviour he displayed (Chandler 2008: 66-73). 
After Jayavarman VII and the demise of Angkor, Buddhism remained an influential force in 
royal circles, and its popularity continued to grow. In time, Theravada Buddhism (the strand 
practiced in Cambodia today) overtook the earlier preferred Mahayana Buddhism, and the 
foundational principles of the Buddhist cosmology established itself within courts and 
villages (Harris 2005: 30-48). 
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The Buddhist cosmology that took root in 15th century Cambodia – and, as far as it is possible 
to discern from the scarce available evidence, remained relatively unchanged until the 19th 
century – was, however, shaped by the country´s religious history. Within 19th century 
Buddhism, new and old notions had been intertwined to form a number of syncretic 
articulations (Edwards 2007: 97; Forrest 2008: 16, 19-22). Perhaps building on the 
foundations laid by Jayavarman VII (see for example Chandler 2008: 66-73), Hindu notions 
of a divine monarchy with spiritual connections were intertwined with a karmic perspective 
that emphasised the societal force of bon (merit) (Harris 2005: 79-80). Merit, according to 
karmic theory, is a force – collected by benevolent and righteous acts during the continual 
process of birth and rebirth that define human existence – that determines roles within the 
social hierarchy (Hansen 2007: 20). Power, within this moral order, is connected to those with 
an abundance of merit, and since merit is accumulated through morally commendable acts, 
those with power are perceived to be entitled to the societal position they occupy (Jacobsen & 
Stuart-Fox 2013: 10,11,14). As a result, kings were perceived to be sacred characters that 
gained strength from their superior merit (Harris 2005: 79-80), and the force of merit acted as 
an important organisational principle throughout the societal structure. 
 
According to 19th century Buddhism, the history of the world was characterised by a process 
of decline and regeneration where its destruction and rebirth were connected to merit. Merit 
was thus a force that connected the interests of the upper and lower levels of society by 
constructing a moral order where righteous behaviour became connected to societal prosperity 
(Hansen 2007: 20-23). The king had a central role in this order, and was perceived as the 
protector of the realm and the guardian of morality. The righteous leader, underpinned by his 
superior merit, was meant to guide the population and lead society towards prosperity and 
moral development (Hansen 2007: 20-22, 33, 42). However, at the end of the 19th century, a 
new cultural force was introduced to the Cambodian public, and it was within the confines of 
this encounter that the foundations for the modern perception of Khmerness began to emerge 
(Edwards 2007: 7-8). 
 
 
5.2.2 Constructing Khmerness: Modern Re-articulations  
 
During the French protectorate, the Khmer social elite was suddenly faced with an occidental 
perspective of their own history and culture. The French brought their own perspectives and 
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interpretations, and when these imageries were projected to the Khmer, a new space for 
cultural transformation opened up (Edwards 2007: 8-12). Two particular articulations 
engendered in the encounter between French cultural imaginings and Cambodia´s pre-existing 
traditional foundations seem to have had a lasting impact on perceived Khmerness – the 
reinvention of Angkor and the modernisation of Buddhism.  
 
As the French ravelled in their self-proclaimed discovery of the Angkor Vat temple complex, 
they proudly presented it as a symbol of national pride and heritage. While historical records 
suggest that this interpretation was a bit misinformed, and that Angkor was an important, and 
not forgotten, spiritual centre (Edwards 2007:  19-26, 125-129), this depiction did not match 
the narrative promoted by the French. According to them, Angkor Vat was the pinnacle of a 
lost civilisation that, under their tutelage, could be reinstated to its former glory (Edwards 
2007: 2). The Khmer, within the French narrative, were distant descendants of a once grand 
civilisation that, through centuries of decline, now were in desperate need of protection 
(Chandler 1997: 35, 37-39). Based on these premises, an imagery portraying the bravery and 
glory of the lost ancient Khmer civilisation was disbursed throughout the architectural and 
cultural landscape. Over time, the spiritual roots of Angkor began to fade, and the temples 
were reinvented as a national symbol, and the greatness, skill, and bravery of those who built 
it were portrayed as the epitome of the proud Khmer population (Edwards 2007: 10-12, 51-
53, 61-63, 150, 164-165). 
 
The modernisation of Buddhism was not guided by the same direct colonial influence – 
religious influences from Siam and a growing internal will to adapt Buddhism to a modern 
context were more important factors (Harris 2005: 130; Edwards 2007: 95-96; Hansen 2007: 
77) – but since it became intertwined with the emerging nationalist movement and the quest 
for independence (Edwards 2007: 220), it had an important impact on perceived Khmerness. 
The Buddhist modernisation movement wanted a more “rational” religion. Instead of “old 
superstitions”, proponents of modernisation wanted a religion that followed the “true” words 
of the Buddha. In their eyes, the traditional manuscript culture that formed the basis of 19th 
century Buddhism – where merit was gained by reciting old scriptures (without understanding 
its content) – needed to be replaced by an order that placed a greater emphasis on individual 
acts and behaviour, and where everybody should be able to understand and live according to 
the true words of the Buddha (Edwards 2007: 104-106: Hansen 2007: 101, 178-181). Within 
this order, merit remained a vital organisational principle, and individual morality and 
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meritorious acts were seen as the true path towards a prosperous society. Such meritorious 
acts could, for example, include feeding monks, donating to the Sangha (the monastic 
community), building schools, participating in religious ceremonies, and providing for the 
poor (Jacobseb & Stuart-Fox 2013: 11). In the 1930s, modernist Buddhism became the 
dominating perspective (Hansen 2007: 178-181), and within the emerging nationalist 
movement, a new generation of intellectuals saw its fundamental principles as an important 
part of the Khmer identity (Edwards 2007: 95-97). 
 
Within the nationalist movement, Khmer Buddhist modernist principles were intertwined with 
the reinvented myths and traditions that defined the ancestral brilliance of the Angkorean 
civilisation, and promoted as the fundamental traits of the Khmer identity. Through a variety 
of disbursement methods, including the newly established newspaper media, this imagery was 
eventually spread beyond elite circles and incorporated into the consciousness of the wider 
population (Edwards 2007: 7-8, 10-12, 210- 213, 218-221).  
 
The perception of Khmerness would, however, not only serve as a unifying tool in the 
colonial independence movement. Its legacy has remained an important feature of the 
political landscape, and the imaginations associated with Khmerness have become an 
important political tool for all of Cambodia´s post-independence regimes (Edwards 2007: 
249- 253). As will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, the current regime is 
not an exception to this tradition, and the perception of Khmerness has played an important 
role in the legitimising narrative constructed to justify Cambodia´s modern patronage system. 
 
 
5.3 Modern Patronage and Culturally Manipulated 
Justifications: Political Legitimacy in Contemporary 
Cambodia 
 
Political legitimacy is a multi-faceted concept with both external and internal dimensions. 
External legitimacy is often connected to how the international community perceives a 
regime´s ability to comply with the rules and regulations that define a free and fair electoral 
process (Hughes 2009: 31-32) and, within the Cambodian context, this dimension has been 
pursued by superficially adhering to international stipulates, and by either implementing 
strategic reforms within areas that do not directly affect their power position, or ensuring that 
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reformed organisations remain within their control (Ear 2009: 163-165; Öjendal & Lilja 2009: 
7-9; Un 2011: 551; Un & Hughes 2011: 199-202, 204-205, 208). Through this delicate 
manoeuvring, the political elite has been able to maintain the fundamental functioning of the 
modern patronage system that underpins their power, whilst still gaining enough external 
legitimacy to secure continued support from the international community (Ear 2009: 162-163; 
Cock 2010a: 242). However, while the elite´s exploits on the international stage are worthy of 
further scrutiny, my main focus here is on the dynamics of internal legitimacy. 
 
In contemporary Cambodia, the underpinnings of internal legitimacy are not automatically 
associated with democracy. Instead, a number of studies have indicated that informal rules 
and conventions have subverted or re-invented many of the formal rules and regulations that 
are meant to guide political actions within a democratic system (Gyallay-Pap 2007: 75-81; 
Lilja 2008: 289-291; Lilja & Öjendal 2009: 300; Springer 2011: 2544-2545; Hughes 2013: 
144- 146; Öjendal & Ou 2013: 374; Baaz & Lilja 2014: 5-8). As such, informal, or 
conventional, rules have remained a significant influence on the rules that govern power 
relations, and while electoral legitimacy appears to be relatively well established (Hughes 
2009: 33) – i.e. that politicians accept that the basis of their power depends on an ability to get 
votes from the public – the ideas and behaviour that guide the pursuit of these votes do not 
conform to a democratic logic (Öjendal & Lilja 2009: 2-3). Understanding political 
legitimacy in contemporary Cambodia, therefore, requires a better grasp of the 
informal/conventional rules that underpin public perceptions. Such perceptions are, of course, 
hard to capture, but I contend that important insights can be gained by exploring a 
phenomenon that can be referred to as “Cambodia´s political theatre” (see for example 
Ledgerwood 2008). 
 
 
5.3.1 Cambodia´s Political Theatre: Constructing the Foundations of 
Regime Legitimacy 
 
A political theatre, as I define it here, is an umbrella term for the rhetoric and behaviour used 
to construct a legitimising narrative for the current political establishment. The values and 
traits attached to Khmerness have an important part in this process, and as will be discussed 
below, within Cambodia´s political theatre, Angkorean symbolism and Buddhist 
cosmological foundations have been manipulated, re-invented, and transformed into a 
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legitimising narrative that portrays the elite as capable protectors, guardians of morality, and 
righteous leaders that will guide the nation towards prosperity.  
 
The first dimension of Cambodia´s political theatre is constituted by the projection of 
protection and menace. In a similar manner as Sihanouk once proclaimed to be the father of 
the nation, the contemporary elite is using a rhetoric that highlights the beneficial features of 
the traditional patron-client relationship and portrays themselves as the country´s protectors 
(Hughes 2006: 469-471, 479). As we saw above, trust in the protective character of the 
patron-client structure, or Khsae as it is referred to in Khmer, is still prevalent among the 
population. To elicit a sense of protection, backed up by menace, the elite, and Hun Sen in 
particular, has used an imagery connected to the perception of the traditional leader of the 
Khsae, the Bong Thom (big brother). The Bong Thom is the fair, but ruthless, leader of the 
traditional Khsae that offers protection and benefits to his loyal followers, but ensures that 
any acts of disloyalty or resistance will be met with harsh punishments (Hughes 2006: 470-
471). Such ideas of morally condoned violence is a recurring theme in traditional Khmer 
tales, and the notion of justifiable violence still appears to be somewhat accepted by 
contemporary Cambodians (Edwards 2008: 216-218). Due to his personal influence over the 
military and police, Hun Sen certainly got the institutional means to back up the menace-
related aspect of his image, and the consistent stream of public violence and intimidations that 
have been connected to his rule could have helped to cement this image in the public 
consciousness. For some, the current regime is associated with stability and peace, and their 
removal could result in a new wave of war and insecurity. 
 
     “Without Hun Sen we would have war. Because Hun Sen is a strong leader, others have no experience. Hun 
Sen is a hero. He can die for the people. He does not run away. He fights for the people” [my translation] 
(Informant H, 7th of May 2017). 
 
Hun Sen himself promotes this perception, and has repeatedly suggested that a victory for the 
opposition could result in a new civil war (Sokchea & Dara 2017; Informant G, 7th of May 
2017). Violence and fear thus, in quite a contradictory manner, seem to have become an 
aspect of legitimacy. By evoking the imagery connected to the Bong Thom – an imagery 
reminiscent of the leadership that is believed to have underpinned the greatness of ancient 
kings and the prosperous Angkorean civilisation – the elite is constructing a narrative that 
portrays them as the only leaders capable of retaining stability and order (Hughes 2006: 471, 
479). 
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To further promote the protective aspect of their legitimacy, however, the elite has to show 
that they are capable of providing the population with material security and societal 
improvements (Edwards 2008: 221- 225). Studies of leadership and voting preferences have 
implied that the Khmer public is relatively uninterested in the ideological foundations of a 
political party (Hughes 2006: 479). Instead, the preferred leaders are those supported by the 
traditional perceptions of “righteous leadership” – an aspect explored in further detail below – 
and those who can prove that they are capable of delivering local improvements and material 
benefits (Vimalea et al 2009: 87-89; Baaz & Lilja 2014: 16). Many of the villagers I talked to  
expressed similar views.    
 
      “A good leader builds schools for the children, fix the roads and bridges, and help people when they need 
help” (Informant N, 9th of May). “Hun Sen is a good leader because he rebuilt the country after the Khmer 
Rouge. Before we had nothing, now we have hospitals, bridges, cars and motorbikes” (Informant I, 8th of May 
2017). “If some place needs help, he [Hun Sen] will be there. If someone is poor, if the pagoda is poor, he will 
help them too” (Informant J, 8th of May 2017) [my translations].   
 
Hun Sen seems to be well aware of such perceptions and, through what can be considered an 
elaborate self-promotion attempt (Hughes 2006: 472; Edwards 2008: 224), he has 
orchestrated a number of “personal” development initiatives. These initiatives range from 
small-scale ceremonial handouts of money and supplies to large-scale infrastructural projects 
that, among other things, have covered the geographical landscape with buildings bearing his 
personal monogram. Through closely directed ceremonies broadcasted to the public by the 
elite-controlled media apparatus, Hun Sen and other members of the political elite, are shown 
interacting with a grateful public overwhelmed by the personal generosity they display 
(Hughes 2006: 472-478; Edwards 2008: 220-221). In a style reminiscent of both Jayavarman 
VII´s and Sihanouk´s early use of the patron-client system, Hun Sen´s “personal” projects 
(often founded by foreign donors or wealthy allies) have been used to portray him as the 
benevolent benefactor that works tirelessly to protect his loyal followers (Hughes 2006: 472-
478). This imagery has traditional roots, and the meritorious acts that the elite displays are 
meant to invoke a sense of righteous leadership promoted by the merit-based Buddhist 
cosmology (Jacobsen & Stuart-Fox 2013: 18). The “gifts” bestowed upon the public gain a 
certain amount of moral authority from Cambodia´s cultural legacy – a legacy that 
emphasises the role of merit and the socially binding force of reciprocal gift-giving (Nissen 
2005: 50-55; 2008: 275-276) – but under the tutelage of the current political regime, this 
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tradition has been reinvented and turned into a large-scale secular operation meant the project 
a sense of merit-based legitimacy (Hughes 2006 472-478: Edwards 2008: 220-225). By 
continuously projecting expressions of their personal generosity and selfless commitment to 
the public, the elite is promoting a narrative that portrays them as the personal patrons of 
Cambodia´s development, and illustrates how they, through the superior merit they possess, 
have the capacity to guide the country towards prosperity (Heder 2012: 104; Jacobsen & 
Stuart-Fox 2013: 18-20). 
 
Such appeals to the traditional perception of “righteous leadership” are recurring themes in 
Cambodia´s political theatre. In addition to the reinvented gift-giving tradition, Hun Sen has, 
for example, tried to enhance his personal “moral legitimacy” by inventing a narrative that 
connects him to the revered 16th century King, Sdech Kan (Heder 2012: 104; Norén-Nilsson 
2013: 4). Sdech Kan, the quintessential neak mean bon (man of merit), was a king that rose 
from humble beginnings and, through his personal prowess, earned his place at the throne by 
overthrowing a cruel and unjust ruler. Guided by his fairness and superior merit, he quickly 
gained the trust and admiration of the population and helped to usher in a sustained period of 
national prosperity (Norén-Nilsson 2013: 6-8, 11-12). In a presumed attempt to benefit from 
the perception and collective memory of Sdech Kan´s righteous leadership, Hun Sen has 
repeatedly emphasised the similarities with his own life story and rise to power. Building on, 
and in some cases inventing, such similarities, Hun Sen has tried to portray himself as the 
modern neak mean bon and the righteous leader of contemporary Cambodia (Norén-Nilsson 
2013: 4-8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20-21). 
 
On a somewhat larger scale, the righteous leadership of the elite has been promoted by 
incorporating the Sangha (the monastic community) into the political theatre. The Buddhist 
community has, historically, been a force capable of placing some restraints on the political 
elite´s use of power (Kent 2003: 3). However, even though the Buddhist discourse can still be 
used to challenge the current social order (Marston 2009: 247-248), within the modern 
political context, the social role of Buddhism has increasingly been subverted to the interests 
of the political elite. Instead of aligning elite behaviour to the Buddhist precepts (as has been 
the traditional role of the Sangha), representatives of the Buddhist community are now used 
to construct a religious legitimacy for the modern behaviour that underpins the elite´s power 
position (Kent 2003: 2-3; 2006: 354-355; O`Lemmon 2014: 38). In this process, prominent 
monastic figures have been co-opted into the overarching patronage networks of the elite and, 
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through a combination of intimidation and inducements, convinced to convene the elite´s 
political messages (Kent 2006: 354-355; Marston 2009: 246).  
 
To further emphasise their moral authority, the elite has also co-opted the religious space of 
the pagoda. In recent years, the elite presence within the pagoda sphere has increased, and by 
becoming major sponsors and leading figures in merit-making activities, many pagodas have 
been transformed from spaces of religious devotion to spaces of political manifestation and 
spiritual propaganda (Kent 2003: 18-21; 2007: 342-352; O´Lemmon 2014: 38-40).  
 
When these tactics are put together, it illustrates the kind of moral legitimacy that the elite is 
trying to evoke through their political theatre. To construct their invented morally legitimising 
narrative, people and spaces imbued with moral superiority have increasingly been co-opted, 
and the authority of these institutions has been used to portray the elite as patrons of religion 
and guardians of the morality that upholds the Buddhist cosmology.  
 
Cambodia´s political theatre, then, can be conceived as an elaborate attempt to construct a 
legitimising narrative for the dynamics that define the modern patronage system. As we have 
seen, the re-invented traditional myths and modernised religious foundations that underpin the 
historically constructed perception of Khmerness have become a recurring theme in the elite´s 
attempts to justify the contemporary order. Through these elaborate cultural manipulations, 
the ruling elite has been able to construct a veil of traditional legitimacy for the exploitative 
patronage system that underpins their power. By drawing on the notions inherent in the 
historically constructed perception of Khmerness, they have tried to portray modern patronage 
as a mutually reciprocal protective relationship, elevate themselves to a position of national 
patrons, and co-opt features of the Buddhist belief system that defines them as righteous 
power holders.  
 
To what extent this political theatre is believed by the Khmer public is, however, questionable 
(Hughes 2006: 482; Kent 2006: 350-351; O´Lemmon 2014: 40-49; Norén-Nilsson 2016: 795, 
814). Khmer people are not just impressionable spectators easily fooled by the loud and bright 
distractions showed towards them by the elite and their political theatre. The aftermath of the 
2013 election, for example, indicates that the population is becoming more aware of the 
injustices and inequalities emanating from the current social order (Informant B, 4th April 
2017; Informant D, 6th April 2017). Gift-giving as a form of large scale vote-buying is now 
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largely dismissed by the public (Informant B, 4th of April 2017; Informant C, 5th of April 
2017; Informant D, 6th of April 2017) and, while every villager I were able to talk to still 
believe that Hun Sen is a man with a lot of merit (because he would not have reached his 
position without it) (Informants F-O), the negative aspects of his rule have now begun to 
influence perceptions. Some, including a local monk, even suggested that, if he did not 
change his behaviour, his supply of merit would soon be emptied (Informant G 7th of May 
2017; Informant M, 9th of May 2017; Informant O, 9th of May 2017).  
 
However, while Khmer people are becoming more aware of the political underpinnings of the 
elite´s culturally manipulated tropes and tactics (Norén-Nilsson 2016:  795, 814), this 
heightened awareness might not become the transformative catalyst that is hoped for. As 
could be said about so many social phenomena, the strength of its impact does not emanate 
from a singular force; it is engendered through the combined effects of many different forces 
acting in conjunction with each other. For Cambodia, the culturally manipulated political 
theatre gains its strength from its entanglement with the very real forces that constitute the 
modern patronage system. When the ruling elite’s cultural manipulations are added to the 
material foundations of the political system, it creates an institutionalised social order that 
combines threats of violence with promises of protection and an invented, but still very much 
present, appeal to a higher moral order. Such a context, even if its premises are not 
internalised and completely accepted by everybody, provides the population with very few 
available means of rejection and spaces of contestation (Hughes 2006: 488-489). 
 
Political legitimacy, therefore, needs to be understood and analysed in the light of the fear, 
hopes of protection, and belief in the Buddhist moral cosmology that underpin public 
perceptions of the current system. Based on the information presented throughout this paper, 
it could be argued that it is these three pillars – fear, protection, and moral authority – that 
intertwine to form the foundations of political legitimacy in contemporary Cambodia. The 
logics inherent in Cambodia´s modern patronage system have engendered a set of established 
governing rules that combine a superficial, but accepted, electoral process with an underlying 
dynamic where access and maintenance of power are reliant on an ability to build and 
cultivate extensive networks of exploitative patronage. Through a combination of violence-
induced intimidation and promises of protection, the elite has constructed a legitimising 
narrative that connects political stability and prosperity to the preservation of their political 
rule. Many Cambodians might be aware of the invented character of this logic, but as long as 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 44	
the elite is capable to finance the cohesion of their patronage networks and provide enough 
evidence to the public of how their righteous rule is guiding the country towards prosperity, 
the legitimacy of the reigning social order can be maintained. Appeals to righteous leadership 
are an important part of the elite´s political theatre, and by reinventing the country´s cultural 
and traditional heritage, they have constructed a culturally manipulated belief system that 
supports the actions and behaviour that underpin their power. Finally, through carefully 
directed ceremonies and widely broadcasted gift-giving rituals, the public is presented with a 
consistent flow of people expressing their consent for the contemporary political 
establishment. 
 
Thus, to remain a legitimate political force, the contemporary elite needs to: 1) project a sense 
of state cohesion and protective capability – a sense maintained through the modern patronage 
system; 2) maintain an, at least superficial, support for their political theatre; and, 3) through 
the state controlled media outlets, convince the public that there is a widespread consent for 
their rule. In the end, this articulation of political legitimacy can give us some important 
insights into the conductivity of different forms of development initiatives.  
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6. Political Legitimacy and Development in 
Contemporary Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
 
While many development initiatives, worldwide, fail to produce pro-poor outcomes, the 
ruling elite´s quest for political legitimacy can be used to get a better understanding of the 
factors that hinder this process in Cambodia. Seen through the prism of political legitimacy, it 
is, for example, not very surprising that externally promoted strategies that emphasise the 
virtues of “good governance” have produced such meagre results (see for example Ear 2007: 
68; 2009: 151-153; Un & Hughes 2011: 208; Hughes 2013: 144-146). Successful 
implementation of these policies – i.e. achievement of pro-poor development outcomes – 
relies on a fundamental change in Cambodia´s modern patronage system (since it could be 
argued that it, due to its inherent tendency to exploit the poor and drain resources away from 
the public domain, is an important structural cause of the country´s poverty). However, since 
the protection and maintenance of the modern patronage dynamics is an integral part of the 
elite´s legitimacy, any overarching attempts at reforming the foundations of this system will 
most likely be met with severe political resistance.  
 
Previous experiences support this inference. Attempted reform within areas that affect the 
foundations of Cambodia´s modern patronage system have had very limited impacts, and, in 
some cases, regression has been a more prominent result than improvement (Ear 2009: 173-
175). After almost two decades of internationally sponsored good governance reforms, Sophal 
Ear (2007, 2009), for example, has concluded that, despite having spent billions of dollars, 
these strategies have failed to make a significant contribution to both Cambodia´s governance 
situation (with the exception of political stability) and the state of poverty within the country 
(2007: 68, 76-78; 2009: 157-159). He even suggests that the continued flow of international 
aid, even with the accompanying requirements of good governance, has made a more 
significant contribution towards preserving the current order than it has done to change the 
exploitative structures that underpin it (Ear 2009: 159-165).  
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Others have drawn similar conclusions (Cock 2010a), and years of attempted institutional 
reforms within the upper levels of the Cambodian state apparatus have produced few 
encouraging tendencies (Un & Hughes 2011: 200-201). As was discussed earlier, reforms of 
the judiciary have been skilfully managed, manipulated and subverted to the overarching 
patronage system, and it could be argued that this process has been reproduced within other 
areas of the state. Reforms within the land and natural resource management sector have, for 
example, produced few tangible improvements. Due to its central role in the maintenance of 
elite legitimacy, powerful political actors have a strong interest in keeping this sector from 
becoming an independently operating unit. To counteract reforms that would undermine their 
influence, new institutions and regulatory frameworks have been created in accordance to the 
demands of reformers and the international community, but the people placed in charge of 
these mechanisms are directly connected to, and controlled through, the Khsae of the ruling 
elite. Such superficial changes allow the elite to project a sense of compliance and progress, 
whilst still remaining firmly in control (Un & So 2009: 128-129; Un & Hughes 2011: 206-
208, 218; Un & So 2011: 289, 306-308).  
 
As these examples illustrate, Cambodia´s political context, and the foundations of political 
legitimacy it engenders, can have a significant impact on the conditions for certain forms of 
pro-poor development policies. In contemporary Cambodia, development policies that aim to 
achieve pro-poor developmental outcomes cannot, or at least, should not, be solely focused on 
overarching governance reforms. Such efforts can easily be manipulated and reoriented to 
conform to the existing governance structures that define the modern patronage system. Since 
collective interests, according to the dynamics inherent in the social organisation of power, 
most likely will be met in ways that contribute to the preserved legitimacy of the ruling 
regime, top down governance reforms only work against, not with, the forces that characterise 
Cambodia´s political context. Political legitimacy in contemporary Cambodia is persevered 
by promoting a sense of fear, protection, and moral authority; not by striving for some 
abstract democratic ideal. Within this context, convincing the public that the stability and 
prosperity of the country rely on the elite´s protection and righteousness is more important 
than living up to the societal ideals promoted by the international community.  
 
Cambodia´s articulation of political legitimacy does not, however, necessarily only engender 
developmental obstacles. Turning its limitations into possibilities, though, would require 
strategies that are adapted to work within, not only against, the modern patronage system. 
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Such strategies are of course difficult to envision, especially from an outside perspective, but 
some initial insights can be gained by examining areas where important progress has actually 
been achieved. The reform of Phnom Penh´s water management system provides one such 
potential example (Hughes 2013: 146). The leader of that particular project, Ek Sonn Chann, 
was a high ranking member of the CPP, and through his involvement in, and knowledge of, 
the logics of the political system, the dynamics of modern patronage could be turned into an 
organisational advantage. By rearticulating donor rhetoric and aligning it with a more familiar 
local imagery, at the same time as he used his personal connections to isolate the project from 
further political interference, Ek was able to frame the project in a manner that both complied 
with donor requirements and that was perceived to be unthreatening to other members of the 
indigenous elite. Ek´s reforms also happened to correspond to the elite´s legitimacy building 
strategy. At that time, CPP were in the midst of orchestrating an extensive “beautification” of 
Phnom Penh – meant to invoke a sense of emerging prosperity and progress – and an 
improved water supply fitted neatly into the imagery they tried to project. Combined, an 
intricate knowledge of the political system, an ability to avoid undermining the influence of 
other elite actors, and the alignment with the pursuit of political legitimacy, allowed Ek to 
establish a functioning organisation and improve water access throughout the capital (Hughes 
2013: 146-148).  
 
Other influential development schemes have followed a similar pattern (Un & Hughes 2011: 
208, 215-218), and while it is not possible to reproduce the exact conditions that made these 
reforms successful, they provide some important insights into Cambodia´s developmental 
realities. Within this reality, development efforts that adapt to work within the modern 
patronage system, avoid obvious attempts at undermining established patterns of influence 
and power, and are framed in ways that, at least perceptually, contribute toward the 
legitimacy of the ruling elite, are more conductive and able to make a substantial impact. This 
is perhaps not the most compelling development alternative – especially due to the 
exploitation and atrocities attributed to the ruling elite – but, based on the dynamics of the 
current political context, it might be the most pragmatic.   
 
While it will be difficult to design development efforts that correspond to these criteria, the 
ruling elite´s quest for political legitimacy provides a potential opening. Since political 
legitimacy is built on notions of fear, protection, and moral authority, the elite continuously 
needs to convince the public that they have the capability to preserve stability and moral 
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order, and guide the country towards increased material prosperity. At the very top of the 
social hierarchy, such notions are reinforced through ceremonies, rituals and rhetoric that 
promote their inherent Khmerness, but this theatre cannot be sustained without tangible 
improvements at the local/village level. This has been especially prevalent in the post-2013 
electoral landscape. After the 2013 election (where CPP suffered some surprising losses), the 
elite has been forced to change their political approach, and this has meant that they have, at 
least to a higher extent, tried to align their strategies with the needs and priorities of the 
electorate (Informant B, 4th April 2017; Informant C, 5th of April 2017). To fulfil the 
contemporary ideals of righteous leadership, the benevolent benefactors now have to prove 
their ability to improve the conditions for their supporters – a sense echoed in the perception 
of the villagers I was able to talk to. For both the young (Informant M, 9th of May 2017; 
Informant N, 9th of May 2017) and the old (Informant L, 8th of May 2017; Informant J, 8th of 
May 2017), good leadership was associated with improvement of their immediate material 
environment. In short, the elite´s legitimacy is, despite the exploitative dynamic of their rule, 
intrinsically intertwined with the ability to project a sense of material improvement at the 
local level. Thus, to evoke notions of stability, protection and progress, the elite needs to 
produce, or at least evoke a perception of, improved local conditions. Since this change 
usually falls outside of their own personal domain, this pressure is diverted to lower level 
public servants. These local authorities are the ones that manage a majority of the contact with 
the population (Craig & Kimchoeun 2011: 224-226), and to retain and strengthen the 
legitimacy of their superiors (and by extension their own positions), local officials are 
pressured to deliver more effective local governance and material improvements (Sedara & 
Öjendal 2009: 114; Un & Hughes 2011: 199-200).  
 
Within Cambodia´s modern patronage system, local representatives are thus given a 
development mandate (Hughes et al 2011: 248), and their proximity to the villagers, their 
local knowledge, and their personal connection to the spatial domain, are all factors that could 
contribute to the hypothetical developmental potential of these agents. Unfortunately, reality 
does not always corresponds to hypothetical ideals, and local authorities have, for a number of 
reasons explored in more detail below, not been able to live up to their development potential. 
However, unfulfilled potential aside, development strategies that utilise the role, expectations, 
and capacity of local authorities could represent an avenue of improvement that is both 
aligned with the elite´s quest for political legitimacy, and capable of providing pro-poor 
developmental outcomes.  
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6.1 Strengthening Local Development Capabilities in a 
Modern Patronage System: Possible Problems and 
Potential Possibilities 
 
Before I venture into the potentials and problems with local authorities, it should be reiterated 
that the premise of this paper has only been to explore Cambodia´s political context and the 
foundations of political legitimacy it engenders, and use this information to explore the 
conditions for pro-poor development policies. Based on the information that I have been able 
to gather, Cambodia´s political context creates a situation where overarching good 
governance reforms will, most likely, continue to have a very limited impact on the structural 
causes of poverty, whilst development strategies that attempt to strengthen, and work through, 
local authorities, represent a promising avenue of improvement more capable of producing 
pro-poor developmental outcomes. Such initiatives conform to Cambodia´s articulation of 
political legitimacy – since they represents development efforts that correspond to the ideals 
and imageries that underpin the perceptions the elite want to project to the public – and could, 
therefore, be more conductive to Cambodia socio-political reality. Whit that said, to pretend 
that I, at this point, have enough information to speculate about a specific strategy that could 
be used to strengthen local development capabilities, without only contributing to the 
perpetuation of an exploitative and corrupt elite, would be both naïve and potentially 
misleading. More research is needed before it will be possible to make such conclusions. 
What can be done at this stage, however, is to, at least briefly, try to weave together insights 
from existing research on the subject and explore the most prevalent obstacles and promising 
tendencies.  
 
Local authorities – i.e. the commune and village levels of the government (Hasselskog 2009: 
192) – are, as most other areas of Cambodia, affected by the country´s turbulent history. 
Originally established in the 1920s as a part of the French administrative reforms, the local 
government has long been perceived to be a coercive instrument of the ruling regimes. 
Subsequently, local authorities have suffered from a lack of public trust, and despite some 
recent perceptual transformations, a lingering sense of suspicion continues to surround these 
organisations (Hasselskog 2009: 199-200; Sedara & Öjendal 2009: 114-119; Hughes et al 
2011: 246-249). However, despite the local government´s complicated history, the idea of 
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decentralisation reforms is not new, and since it was first introduced in 2002, the commune 
election has reshaped the local governmental landscape. Today, the local government is 
comprised of a commune and village level. The former level is governed by a multi-party 
council, headed by a commune chief appointed by the political party that gets the most seats 
in the commune election. The multi-party council appoints the village chief, and together, this 
group is in charge of the administration and development of the commune (Hughes et al 2011: 
246-249). An important part of this mandate is to produce the commune´s development 
budget (Craig & Kimchoeun 2009: 220-221; Hughes et al 2011: 248). Unfortunately, a 
number of different factors intertwine to limit the developmental capability of commune 
councils. 
 
Chronic underfunding, low organisational capability, unclear assignment of duties, 
corruption, and an inherent lack of trust, have all been mentioned as prominent reasons for the 
inefficiencies of local authorities (Hasselskog 2009: 194-200; Sedara & Öjendal 2009: 118-
119; Informant A, 4th of April 2017; Informant B, 4th of April 2017; Informant E, 21st of April 
2017), but the problems do, arguably, go deeper than this. Despite being spatially distant from 
the epicentre of political power, local representatives are not detached from its influence 
(Sedara & Öjendal 2009:121; Craig & Kimchoeun 2011: 219-226). Breaking this attachment 
has proved to be quite difficult. The strings that connect local actors to their national patrons 
are long and durable, and this has made the decentralisation process slow and sporadic. Even 
at the local level, powerful individuals have an interest in preserving the current order, and 
due to their connections, they have the capacity to co-opt and circumvent decentralisation 
reforms (Hughes 2013: 149-153).  
 
In some ways, the repercussions of the Seila program illustrate this inherent problem. The 
Seila programme, introduced in 1996, was an internationally sponsored decentralisation 
effort. The programme wanted to improve the relationship between the local government and 
the population, and believed that by strengthening the capability of local authorities, these 
units could be transformed into accountable development agents. Working on these premises, 
Seila introduced a number of mechanisms designed to encourage a more participatory 
development model and make rural villagers an integral part of the planning process 
(Hasselskog 2009: 192-193: Sedara & Öjendal 2009: 108). Unfortunately, politically vested 
interests complicated the implementation process and many of the reforms were co-opted and 
manipulated by influential local actors (Hasselskog 2009: 206; Hughes 2013: 153), and the 
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resulting improvements were used to support the elite´s legitimising narrative (Hughes 2013: 
149-151). 
  
In contrast to reforms of national level governance, however, the political co-optation of local 
reforms has evoked a more tangible sense of dissatisfaction within villages. When local 
leaders abuse their power, the local community has both better reasons to react – because it 
affects their immediate existence and livelihood – and better means to protest (Hasselskog 
2009: 207, 210-211; Sedara & Öjendal 2009: 117). Increased scope for dissatisfaction and the 
relative proximity of local leaders open up a possible zone of contestation (Hasselskog 2009: 
210-213), and it is here that potential possibilities begin to emerge. While the Seila program 
had some problems – organisational difficulties and trust deficiency being the most prevalent 
issues – it illustrates how local authorities have, at least, potential to become development 
agents that, in contrast to national leaders, could be held accountable for their actions 
(Hasselskog 2009: 194-206, 210-213). The programme also showed that some factions of the 
local government embraced their new developmental role. While this faction did not represent 
the majority, such attitudes could, in the long run, have an important impact on the 
expectations and demands the public places upon their local authorities. If one local authority 
is able to provide services and improvements for their community, others should be able to do 
the same (Hasselskog 2009: 215). Such perceptions are indeed becoming more prevalent 
(Informant E, 21st of April 2017), and studies have suggested that local villagers now, for 
example, see the commune election as an important tool that can be used to remove unpopular 
leaders and, in the end, increase their influence over how local resources are spent (Sedara & 
Öjendal 2009: 109, 117). 
 
    “The commune elections have done a lot. Today, these elections can be used to remove unpopular leaders and 
party candidates, and we have done research that show that the decentralisation reforms have improved the 
relationship between the local population and the local government. And now, after a few elections, I think that 
commune councils are more starting to side with the population. The local level politics are now more positive.” 
(Informant B, 4th of April 2017) 
 
Changing local expectations and attitudes, increased ability to question local leaders, and a 
greater influence over how resources are spent are all promising tendencies. As Seila 
illustrated, through decentralisation and more development oriented local authorities, it is 
possible to create a new space for local contestation and resistance, and within this space, 
ideas and attitudes that challenge inequalities and injustices can be allowed to prosper and, 
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eventually, spread throughout the collective consciousness of the village (Hasselskog 2009: 
214). So, while development efforts that aim to strengthen and utilise the development 
potential of local authorities will contribute to the ruling elite´s legitimacy, they also have the 
potential to engender attitudes and expectations that can become catalysts for long-term 
transformative change (Hasselskog 2009: 217; Sedara & Öjendal 2009: 122-129). This 
potential is important. In a country where public space for contestation and resistance are 
increasingly limited (Hughes 2006: 488; Informant A, 4th April 2017), a better ability to 
challenge local inequalities and injustices is a promising tendency.  
 
Turning this promising tendency into substantial progress, however, will depend on a delicate 
negotiation between the self-interests of the elite and the ability to slowly, and over time, 
introduce mechanisms that can protect and nurture local expressions and influence. Stronger 
and more development oriented local authorities will, based on the political legitimacy 
pursued by the elite, most likely be a policy supported by the upper echelons of power. For 
the people at the top of the political hierarchy, the local government represents an integral part 
of the legitimising narrative, and an enhanced ability to deliver local improvements will 
contribute to the imagery they want to promote. For those who work toward less politically 
self-centred goals, this somewhat contradictory conflation of interests (in the sense that both 
parts have a genuine interest in improved local conditions), represents a promising avenue of 
influence. To utilise the developmental space this opens up, however, requires tools that are 
adapted to work within the lower levels of Cambodia´s modern patronage system. Based on 
the findings presented here, the construction of such tools would be a path worth pursuing 
further. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout this paper, I have explored Cambodia´s political context as historically located 
totality engendered by a long historical process characterised by both continuity and change. 
Using this meta-theoretical point of view facilitates for an investigation that focuses on how 
material and ideational forces have interacted throughout history and, eventually, slowly 
stabilised to construct the institutionalised characteristics of the contemporary political 
system. By analysing Cambodia´s political context in this manner, it is possible to discern 
how historical legacies have evolved into the modern setting. This evolution does not 
represent a continuation of ancient governance or a simple transfer of traditional values into a 
modern bureaucracy. There has been a genuine transformation; a fundamental change in how 
societal relations operate. While an existing foundation of patron-client relations, and a trust 
for the protection this provided, were important organisational principles in pre-DK 
Cambodia, the emergence of the current ruling elite and their manipulation of the country´s 
economic transformation reconfigured the logics of patronage. Old patron-client structures 
were transformed into a mass-patronage system where the political elite survived by 
protecting each other, not the people. As the democratic transformation introduced an 
electoral basis of power, the logics of modern patronage were adapted to continue its 
existence within the new system. The new institutions gave the political elite an opportunity 
to expand their influence and – by placing friends, family and loyal followers in crucial 
positions within the institutional structure – consolidate power over the state and its adjacent 
institutions. Under these circumstances, an elaborate network of mutually beneficial relations 
was allowed to prosper and embed itself throughout Cambodia´s societal structure. Today, 
Cambodia´s elite continues their rule through a mass-patronage system that builds on 
corruption and exploitation, but that has been adapted to use a combination of violence, 
intimidation, and material inducements to gain enough votes to secure electoral victories.  
 
The ability to justify methods by reference to tradition and religion have become an important 
aspect of Cambodia´s political context, and it is, arguably, in this intersection between 
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modern patronage and cultural manipulation that the perceptions that underpin political 
legitimacy have been engendered. Within Cambodia´s political theatre, traditional values and 
religious beliefs have been manipulated and re-articulated in a deliberate attempt to construct 
a legitimising narrative for the contemporary elite. Building on the Buddhist notions and 
traditional symbolism that have shaped the public perception of Khmerness, the elite has 
engendered an articulation of political legitimacy that is constructed around notions of fear, 
protection and moral authority. 
 
The political system, and the political theatre that supports it, has now become an 
institutionalised feature of contemporary Cambodia. Through a long and complex historical 
trajectory, the material and ideational domains have been formed and transformed, and 
through the intervention and manipulation of the dominating social force – the ruling elite – 
eventually stabilised in the current articulation. Unfortunately for the Khmer population, this 
articulation is not a beneficial one. However, that does not mean that it is possible to simply 
ignore it or think that shallow reforms will suddenly change the fundamental features that 
underpin the ruling elite´s position. Based on the findings presented in this paper, it is 
ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive, to continue to assume that overarching, 
national-level, governance reform will be the panacea for Cambodian development. Due to 
the internal dynamics of Cambodia´s modern patronage system, such organisational reforms 
are open for political co-optation and manipulation. The implementation of overarching good 
governance reforms might produce a superficial change in the organisational structure, but the 
underlying power relations will remain unchanged. Organisational reforms can even be turned 
into a political weapon used to perpetuate the rule of the elite.  
 
Substantial change, therefore, must come from below and work through pre-existing societal 
frames. Conducting development work within Cambodia´s modern patronage system will 
probably always be a precarious undertaking, but the ability to progress could, at least, be 
improved by acknowledging its specific features, and trying to understand the constraints and 
possibilities it provides. Here, I have suggested that development initiatives that work through 
local authorities represent a path that both corresponds to Cambodia´s articulation of political 
legitimacy, and that, in a longer perspective, could be able to produce pro-poor development 
outcomes. This path is, however, fraught with difficulties, and to be able to utilise the 
possibilities it provides, more research is undoubtedly needed. Future studies need to delve 
deeper into the dynamics of local governance. The bonds between the local and national level 
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need to be more accurately mapped, the local impact of the political theatre needs to be 
further understood, and the everyday work of local authorities needs to be further explored. 
By doing so, future studies can hopefully reveal new insights and tools that can be used to 
work within, not only against, Cambodia´s modern patronage system. 
 
With that, I am not suggesting that we should simply accept the exploitation, corruption, and 
cultural manipulations that characterise contemporary Cambodia, but if the leadership wants 
to play a theatrical political game, learn the rules – learn to play along. Do not introduce your 
own rulebook and expect that everybody will begin to play by your rules. Subverting to the 
logics of localised dynamics does not mean a complete abandonment of what is considered 
right and fair (whatever that now might be), it represents an attempt to adapt to the reigning 
circumstances and work better within the conditions that actually exist. If this paper has been 
able to make a small contribution to this kind of thinking, it has served its purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 56	
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
Baaz, Michael & Lilja, Mona (2014): Understanding Hybrid Democracy in Cambodia: The 
Nexus Between Liberal Democracy, the State, Civil Society, and a “Politics of Presence”, 
Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 5-24  
 
Beetham, David (1991): The Legitimation of Power, London: MacMillan Education Limited 
 
Bieler, Andreas & Morton, David Adam (2004): A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, 
World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations, 
Capital and Class, Vol. 28, No. 82, pp. 85-114 
 
Bruce ST John, Ronald (2005): Democracy in Cambodia- One Decade, US$5 Billion Later: 
What Went Wrong?, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 406-428 
 
Bryman, Alan (2012): Social Research Methods, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Chandler, David (1997): From “Cambodge” to “Kampuchea”: State and Revolution in 
Cambodia, 1863-1979, Thesis Eleven, No. 50, pp. 35-49 
 
Chandler, David (2008): A History of Cambodia, 4th Edition, Westview Press	
 
Cheng, Niem & Dara, Mech (2016): Suspect Charged over Murder of Political Analyst Kem 
Ley, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/suspect-
charged-over-murder-political-analyst-kem-ley, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Chheng, Niem (2017): Sam Rainsy Handed Jail Time in Defamation Case Against PM, 
Phnom Penh Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/sam-rainsy-
handed-jail-time-defamation-case-against-pm, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Chheng, Niem & Turton, Shaun (2016): Held Political Ransom, Phnom Penh Post, Available 
at: http://m.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/held-political-ransom, last accessed 30th of 
March 2017 
 
Cock, Andrew Robert (2010a): External actors and the relative autonomy of the ruling elite in 
post-UNTAC Cambodia, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 241-265 
 
Cock, Andrew Robert (2010b): Anticipating an Oil Boom: The “Resource Course” Thesis in 
the Play of Cambodian Politics, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 525-546 
 
Cock, Robert (2011): The Rise of Provincial Business in Cambodia, in: Cambodia’s 
Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NiasPress 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 57	
Cowen, Michael P. & Shenton, Robert W. (1996): Doctrines of Development, London: 
Routledge 
 
Cox, W. Robert (1981): Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 126-155 
 
Craig, David & Kimchoeun, Pak (2011): Party Financing of Local Investment Projects: Elite 
and Mass Patronage, in Cambodia´s Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, 
Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Dara Mech, Chheng Niem, Samean Lay & Turton, Shaun (2016): Longtime Rights Champion 
Kem Ley Gunned Down in Broad Daylight, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/longtime-rights-champion-kem-ley-gunned-down-
broad-daylight, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Dara, Mech & Turton, Shaun (2016): MP Attackers Promoted, Phnom Penh Post, Available 
at: http://m.phnompenhpost.com/national/mp-attackers-promoted, last accessed 30th of March 
2017 
 
Dara, Mech & Handley, Erin (2017): PM Defends Crackdowns, Offers Warning to Analyst, 
Phnom Penh Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/pm-defends-
crackdowns-offers-warning-analyst, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Davies, Eric W.  (2011): Imagined Parasites: Flows of Money and Spirits, in: Cambodia’s 
Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), NiasPress 
 
Ear, Sophal (2007): The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia, Asian 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 68-96 
 
Ear, Sophal (2009): The Political Economy of Aid and Regime Legitimacy in Cambodia, in 
Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, 
Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.) Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Ear, Sophal (2011): Growth in the Rice and Garment Sector in: Cambodia’s Economic 
Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NiasPress 
 
Edwards, Penny (2007): Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press 
 
Edwards, Penny (2008): The Moral Geology of the Present: Structuring Moral, Menace and 
Merit, in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia 
Today, Kent, Alexandra & Chandler David (eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Escobar, Arturo (1995): Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
 
Finlay, Trevor (1995): Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research 
Report No. 9, Oxford University Press 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 58	
Forest, Alain (2008): Buddhism and Reform: Imposed Reforms and Popular Aspirations. 
Some Notes to Aid Reflection, in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral 
Order in Cambodia Today, Kent, Alexandra & Chandler David (eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS 
Press 
 
Fritz Verena, Levy Brian & Ort Rachel (ed.) (2014): Problem Driven Political Economy 
Analysis: The World Bank Experience, The World Bank 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (1989): The End of History?, National Interest, No. 16, pp. 3-18 
 
Global Witness (2007): Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of 
Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite, A report by Global Witness, June 2007 
 
Global Witness (2009): How Cambodia’s Elite has Captured the Countries Extractive 
Industries, A Report by Global Witness, February 2009 
 
Global Witness (2016): Hostile Takeover: The Corporate Empire of Cambodia´s Ruling 
Family, Global Witness 
 
Gyallay-Pap, Peter (2007): Reconstructing the Cambodian Polity: Buddhism, Kingship and 
the Quest for Legitimacy, in Buddhism, Power and Political Order, Harris, Ian (ed.), London: 
Routledge 
 
Halperin, Sandra & Heath, Oliver (2012): Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills, 
Oxford University Press 
 
Handley, Erin & Baliga, Ananth (2017): 20 Years After Deadly Grenade Attack, Threat of 
Political Violence Remains, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/twenty-years-after-deadly-grenade-attack-threat-
political-violence-remains, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Hansen, Anne Ruth (2007): How to Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia, 
1860-1930, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 
 
Harris, Ian (2005): Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press 
 
Hasselskog, Malin (2009): (Re)Creating Local Political Legitimacy through Governance 
Intervention?, in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-
Conflict Society, Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.) Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Heder, Stephen (2012): Cambodia: Capitalist Transformation by Neither Liberal Democracy 
Nor Dictatorship, Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 103-115  
 
Henke, Roger (2011): NGOs, People´s Movements and Natural Resource Management, in: 
Cambodia´s Economic Transformation, Hughes Caroline & Un Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: 
NIAS Press 
 
Hughes, Caroline (2001): Transforming Oppositions in Cambodia, Global Society, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, pp. 295-318 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 59	
 
Hughes, Caroline (2003): The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991-2001, 
RoutledgeCurzon 
 
Hughes, Caroline (2006): The Politics of Gifts: Traditions and Regimentation in 
Contemporary Cambodia, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 469-489 
 
Hughes, Caroline (2009): Reconstructing Legitimate Political Authority through Elections?, 
in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, 
Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.). Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Hughes, Caroline (2013): Friction, Good Governance and the Poor, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 144-158 
 
Hughes, Caroline & Conway, Tim (2003): Understanding Pro-Poor Political Change: The 
Policy Process – Cambodia, Second Draft, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), United 
Kingdom 
 
Hughes Caroline, Netra Eng, Vimealea Thon, Sivhuoch Ou & Tem, Ly (2011): Local Leaders 
and Big Business in Three Communes, in Cambodia´s Economic Transformation, Hughes, 
Caroline & Kheang Un (eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Hughes Caroline, Un Kheang (2011): Cambodia’s Economic Transformation: Historical and 
Theoretical Frameworks in: Cambodia’s Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, 
Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NiasPress 
 
Human Rights Watch (2015): 30 Years of Hun Sen: Violence, Repression, and Corruption in 
Cambodia, Human Rights Watch 
 
Jacobsen, Trude & Stuart-Fox, Martin (2013): Power and Political Culture in Cambodia, Asia 
Research Institute, Working Paper No. 200, May 2013 
 
Kaufman Daniel, Kraay Art & Zoido-Lobatón Pablo (2000): Governance Matters: From 
Measurement to Action, Finance and Development, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 10- 13 
 
Kaufman Daniel, Kraay Art & Mastruzzi Massimo (2010): The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, Policy Working Paper no. 5430, The World 
Bank  
 
Kent, Alexandra (2003): Recovery of the Collective Spirit: The Role of the Revival of 
Buddhism in Cambodia, Working Paper No. 8, Department of Social Anthropology, Göteborg 
University 
 
Kent, Alexandra (2006): Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in 
Cambodia, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 343-361 
 
Kent, Alexandra (2007): Purchasing Powers and Pagodas: The Sima Monastic Boundary and 
Consumer Politics in Cambodia, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 335-
354 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 60	
Kent, Alexandra & Chandler David (eds.) (2008): People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, 
Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today, Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Kent, Alexandra & Chandler, David (2008): Introduction, in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring 
Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today, Kent, Alexandra & Chandler David 
(eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Kijewski, Leonie (2017): Rights in “Downward Spiral”, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/rights-downward-spiral, last accessed 30th of March 
2017 
 
Kimchoeun Pak, Vuthy Horng, Netra Eng, Sovatha Ann, Sedara Kim, Knowles Jenny, Craig 
David (2007): Accountability and Neo-patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature 
Review, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute 
 
Ledgerwood Judy (2008): Rituals in 1990 Cambodian Political Theatre: New Songs at the 
Edge of the Forest, in At the Edge of the Forest: Essays on Cambodia, History and Narrative 
in Honour of David Chandler, Hansen Ruth Anne & Ledgerwood Judy (eds.), Cornell: SEAP 
 
Ledgerwood, Judy (2012): Buddhist Ritual and the Reordering of Social Relations in 
Cambodia, South East Asia Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 191-205 
 
LICADHO (Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights) (2007): 
Human Rights in Cambodia: The Charade of Justice, Phnom Penh: LICADHO 
 
LICADHO (Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights) (2008): 
Reading Between the Lines: How Politics, Money and Fear Control Cambodia’s Media, 
Phnom Penh: LICADHO 
 
LICADHO (Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (2011): 
Freedom of Expression in Cambodia: The Illusion of Democracy, Phnom Penh: LICADHO 
 
Lilja, Mona (2008): Discourses of Hybrid Democracy: The Case of Cambodia, Asian Journal 
of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 289-309   
 
Lilja, Mona & Öjendal Joakim (2009): The Never Ending Hunt for Political Legitimacy in a 
Post-Conflict Context, in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a 
Post-Conflict Society, Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.) Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Marston, John (2009): Cambodian Religion Since 1989, in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: 
Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.) 
Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
McCargo, Duncan (2005): Cambodia: Getting away with Authoritarianism?, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 98-112 
 
McCarthy, Stephen & Un, Kheang (2017): The Evolution of Rule of Law in Cambodia, 
Democratization, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 100-118 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 61	
Moolakkattu, John S. (2009): Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations, 
International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 439-456 
 
Morgenbesser, Lee (2017): Misclassifications on the Mekong: The Origins of Hun Sen´s 
Personalist Dictatorship, Democratization, pp. 1-18 
 
Muijs, Daniel (2011): Doing Quantitative Research in Education With SPSS, London: Sage 
 
Nissen, Christine (2005): Living under the Rule of Corruption: An Analysis of Everyday 
Forms of Corrupt Practices in Cambodia, Phnom Penh: Centre for Social Development 
 
Nissen, Christine (2008): Buddhism and Corruption, in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring 
Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today, Kent, Alexandra & Chandler David 
(eds.), Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Norén-Nilsson, Astrid (2013): Performance as (Re)incarnation: The Sdech Kan Narrative, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 4-23 
 
Norén-Nilsson, Astrid (2016): Good Gifts, Bad Gifts, and Rights: Cambodian Popular 
Perceptions and the 2013 Elections, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4, pp. 795-815 
 
O´Lemmon, Matthew (2014): Merit-Making Activities and the Latent Ideal of the Buddhist 
Wat in Southwestern Cambodia, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 27-
57 
 
Ollier, Leakthina Chau-Pech & Winter, Tim (2006): Introduction: Cambodia and the Politics 
of Tradition, Identity and Change, in Expressions of Cambodia: The Politics of Tradition, 
Identity and Change, Ollier, Leakthina Chau-Pech & Winter, Tim (eds.), London: Routledge 
 
O`Reilly, Karen (2009): Key Concepts in Ethnography, London: Sage 
 
Osborne, Milton (2007): Cambodia: The Endgame of Politics?, Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 
117-132 
 
Padwe, Jonathan (2011): Cashew, Cash and Capitalism in Northeast Cambodia, in: 
Cambodia’s Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: 
NiasPress 
 
Petersson, Markus (2015): Politics, Patronage and the Persistence of the Ruling Elite in post-
UNTAC Cambodia, Bachelor Thesis, Lund University Student Papers, available at: 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/7763368 
 
Potter B Roberts, Binns, Tony, Elliot A. Jeniffer & Smith, David (2008): Geographies of 
Development: An Introduction to Development Studies, Third Edition, Pearson Education 
Limited  
 
Rist, Gilbert (2008): The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 
Third Edition, London: Zed Books 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 62	
Roberts, David (2002): Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia, 1991-
1999, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 520-538 
 
Sedara, Kim & Öjendal, Joakim (2009): Decentralization as a Strategy for State 
Reconstruction in Cambodia, in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in 
a Post-Conflict Society, Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.). Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Sen, Amartya (1999): Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Slocomb, Margaret (2011): The Privatisation of Cambodia´s Rubber Industry, in: Cambodia’s 
Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NiasPress 
 
Sokchea, Meas & Dara, Mech (2017): Unrest to be Met by Military, Prime Minister Says, 
Phnom Penh Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/unrest-be-met-
military-prime-minister-says, last accessed 11th of May 2017 
 
Sokchea, Meas, Dara, Mech & Turton, Shaun (2017): With Gov´t Poised to Use Convictions 
Against CNRP, Rainsy Exits “For Good of Party”, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/govt-poised-use-convictions-against-cnrp-rainsy-
exits-good-party, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Sokchea, Meas & Turton, Shaun (2017): Party Over for Opposition? Cambodia Watchers 
Wounder if CPP Really will Dissolve CNRP, Phnom Penh Post, Available at: 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/analysis-and-op-ed/party-over-opposition-cambodia-
watchers-wonder-if-cpp-really-will-dissolve-cnrp, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Sokha, Touch & Kijewski, Leonie (2017): PM Files Lawsuit Against Analyst, Phnom Penh 
Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/pm-files-lawsuit-against-analyst, 
last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Springer, Simon (2008): Violence, Democracy and the Neoliberal “Order”: The Contestation 
of Public Space in Cambodia, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 99, 
No. 1, pp. 138-162 
 
Springer, Simon (2011): Articulated Neoliberalism: The Specificity of Patronage, 
Kleptocracy and Violence in Cambodia´s Neoliberalization, Environment and Planning, Vol. 
43, pp. 2554-2570 
 
Springer, Simon (2016): Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse and Dispossession 
in Cambodia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Sullivan, Michael (2011): China’s Aid to Cambodia, in: Cambodia’s Economic 
Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), Copenhagen: NiasPress 
 
Tilly, Charles (2006): Why? What Happens when People Give Reason… and Why, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Transparency International (2014): Corruption and Cambodia´s Governance System: The 
Need for Reform, Transparency International Cambodia 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 63	
Turtun, Shaun (2017): Party Law Breaches International Human Rights Standards say Un, 
Phnom Penh Post, Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/party-law-
breaches-international-human-rights-standards-says-un, last accessed 30th of March 2017 
 
Un, Kheang (2005): Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in 
Cambodia, 1993-2003, Asian Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 203-230 
 
Un, Kheang (2006): State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, No 2 pp. 225-245 
 
Un, Kheang (2009): The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia, in 
Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, 
Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.). Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Un, Kheang (2011): Cambodia: Moving Away from Democracy?, International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 546-562 
 
Un, Kheang (2015): The Cambodian People Have Spoken: Have the Cambodian Peoples 
Party Heard?, Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 2015, pp. 102-116 
 
Un, Kheang & Hughes Caroline (2011): The Political Economy of “Good Governance” 
Reform, in Cambodia’s Economic Transformation, Hughes, Caroline & Un, Kheang (eds.), 
NiasPress 
 
Un, Kheang & So, Sukbunthoeun (2009): The Politics of Natural Resource Use in Cambodia, 
Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 123-138 
 
Un, Khean & So, Sokbunthoeun (2011): Land Rights in Cambodia: How Neopatrimonial 
Politics Restricts Land Policy Reform, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 289-308  
 
Verver, Michiel & Dahles, Heidi (2015): The Institutionalisation of Oknha: Cambodian 
Entrepreneurship at the Interface of Business and Politics, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 48-70  
 
Vimealea Thon, Sivhouch Ou, Netra Eng, Tem Ly (2009): Leadership in Local Politics of 
Cambodia: A Study of Leaders in Three Communes of Three Provinces, CDRI Working 
Paper, No. 42 
 
Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.) (2009): Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political 
Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (2009): Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political 
Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society?, in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political 
Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, Öjendal, Joakim & Lilja, Mona (eds.). 
Copenhagen: NIAS Press 
 
Öjendal, Joakim & Ou, Sivhuoch (2013): From Friction to Hybridity in Cambodia: 20 Years 
of Unfinished Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 36 
 
 
Lund	University,	Master	Thesis	in	Development	Studies,	SIMV07,	Spring	2017	 Markus	Petersson	870425-3312	
	 64	
Informants 
 
Informant A, Country Manager at an International NGO, Interviewed 4th of April 2017 
Informant B, Cambodian Researcher, Interviewed 4th of April 2017 
Informant C, Employee at a Foreign Mission, Interviewed 5th of April 2017 
Informant D, Executive Director at an International NGO, Interviewed 6th of April 2017 
Informant E, Employee at a Foreign Mission, Interviewed 21st of April 
Informant F, Woman, 17 Years Old, Student, Interviewed 4th of May 2017 
Informant G, Male, 35 Years Old, Monk, Interviewed 7th of May 2017 
Informant H, Male, 60 Years Old, Deputy Village Chief, Interviewed 7th of May 2017 
Informant I, Male, 45 Years Old, Teacher, Interviewed 8th of May 2017 
Informant J, Woman, 69 Years Old, Retired Farmer, Interviewed 8th of May 2017 
Informant K, Woman, 69 Years Old, Retired Farmer, Interviewed 8th of May 2017 
Informant L, Male, 66 Years Old, Achar, Interviewed 8th of May 2017 
Informant M, Male, 25 Years Old, Forest Manager, Interviewed 9th of May 2017 
Informant N, Woman, 25 Years Old, Cashier, Interviewed 9th of May 2017 
Informant O, Male, 29 Years Old, Working in South Korea, Interviewed on 9th of May 2017 
